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INTRODUCING THE NEXT CLASS OF 
BASTARD: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
DEFINITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 





Abstract:  After-born children are anachronistic aberrations. 
Defying any commonsense notion of procreation, an after-born 
child is conceived after the death of its parent. While a 
remarkable feat for reproductive medical science, 
posthumously conceived children push the boundaries of 
existing laws, creating problems previous generations of 
lawmakers did not need to consider. This article examines the 
challenges posed by after-born children in the area of intestate 
succession law. More specifically, using the province of 
Ontario as a case study, this article argues that the definitions 
of “child” and “issue” in the Succession Law Reform Act 
[“SLRA”] subject after-born children to inheritance-related 
deprivations on the basis of birth status alone. Creating a new 
class of bastard, this article argues that discriminating against 
a group of children for no reason above and beyond the way in 
which they came into this world is reminiscent of Canada’s 
treatment of children born out of wedlock in the previous 
century. In order to contextualize the discrimination potentially 
faced by the after-born, this article begins by examining the 
legal deprivations resulting from legislation passed in Ontario 
condemning children born out of wedlock to illegitimate status 
in the past. No court in Ontario — or Canada at large — has 
yet had the opportunity to consider the inheritance rights of 
after-born children. Consequently, the article follows with a 
comparative analysis of the statutes and case law on point in 
the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia; it does so in 
order to evaluate the various interests at stake should Ontario 
choose to reform the SLRA. 
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Why bastard? wherefore base? 
When my dimensions are as well compact, 
My mind as generous, and my shape as true, 
As honest madam's issue? Why brand they us 
With base? with baseness? bastardy? base, 
base? 1 
 




Representations of bastard children as “threatening pretender[s] 
to the legal family’s property” have a rich and complicated 
history in both literature and law.2 In fact, the archetype of the 
bastard as private property usurper can trace its origins all the 
way back to the Old Testament. In Judges, the story is told of 
Gideon, a man with “threescore and ten sons of his body 
begotten: for he had many wives.”3 Gideon additionally kept a 
concubine who bore him a son, whom he named Abimelech. 
After his father’s passing, Abimelech — an ambitious man 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  William Shakespeare, King Lear, ed by Jonathan Bate and Eric 
Rasmussen (New York: Modern Library, 2009). The bastard as 
usurper and murderer is an archetype that appears, time and time 
again, in European literature. In King Lear, Edmund is the main 
antagonist of the play. As the illegitimate son of the Earl of 
Gloucester, and younger brother to Edgar, the Earl’s legitimate son, 
Edmund resolves to become Earl himself by escaping the rules of 
primogeniture and getting rid of both his brother and father.   
2  Lisa Zunshine, Bastards and Foundlings: Illegitimacy in Eighteenth-
Century England (Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 2005) 
at 2. The author provides a compelling interdisciplinary study of the 
multiplicity of cultural meanings attached to illegitimacy during the 
English Enlightenment; Zunshine places a special emphasis on 
interpretations of bastardy in “canonical” texts, including Jane 
Austen’s Emma and Henry Fielding’s Tom Jones. 
3  Judges 8: 30-31. 
Introducing the Next Class of Bastard 
	  
who wanted nothing less than the title of King of Israel — 
murdered all but one of his brothers on his path to usurp the 
throne:  
 
Abimelech hired vain and light persons, which 
followed him. And he went unto his father’s 
house at Ophrah, and slew his brethren the sons 
of [Gideon] . . . , upon one stone.4 
 
Abimelech is a legendary “proto-bastard”; he symbolizes 
primary qualities that have come to be associated with bastard 
children over time, namely, parricide, murder, and usurpation.5 
In other words, the belief that bastards are, quite simply, very 
bad people is well documented in fabled stories and legends. 
The consequences of those beliefs, however, transcend fictional 
narratives and biblical cautionary tales. Indeed, hostile feelings 
towards bastards legislated into law create real disabilities 
related to lineage, maintenance and support, and inheritance 
rights.6  
 
In its contemporary usage, the word ‘bastard’ is a 
“term of abuse, almost a swear word”; it is more often used 
“insultingly and metaphorically,” than as a reference to its 
literal or legal ascriptions.7 In law, however, the word ‘bastard’ 
constituted a barometer for legitimacy; it reflected and 
reinforced the traditional Christian belief that “premarital and 
extramarital sexuality were sinful.”8 In short, bastards were the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  Ibid at 9: 4-5. 
5  Jenny Teichman, Illegitimacy: An Examination of Bastardy (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1982) at 127. 
6  Teichman, supra note 5 at 103. 
7  Ibid at 126. 
8  Lori Chambers, Misconceptions: Unmarried Motherhood and the 
Ontario Children of Unmarried Parents Act, 1921-1969 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2007) at 14. 
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illegitimate product of sin; for not only “[were they] begotten, 
[they were] born out of matrimony.”9 In consequence of their 
illegitimate legal birth status, bastards were determined to be 
filius nullius, or, the child of no one at common law. And, 
despite the “obvious [biological] absurdity” of implying that a 
child has no relations or kin, it demonstrates the “primacy of 
legally sanctioned social norms over the alleged facts of 
biology and birth.”10     
 
This paper seeks to disentangle legally sanctioned 
social norms related to biological procreation and birth; it will 
do so by arguing that a new generation of bastards has recently 
been created in law. More specifically, while the last century 
has seen a progressive mitigation of the social and economic 
consequences of illegitimacy for children in Canada,11 legal 
deprivations related to birth status continue to exist for 
particular classes of children. As a result, this paper will focus 
exclusively on one such class, namely, posthumously 
conceived children — otherwise known as the “after-born 
child” in law.12 
 
After-born children are anachronistic aberrations; 
indeed, undermining any commonsense understanding of 
procreation, a posthumous child is conceived after the death of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9  Sir W Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England (New 
York: Wildly and Sons, 1967) at 454.  
10  Roxanne Mykitiuk, “Beyond Conception: Legal Determinations of 
Filiation in the Context of Assisted Reproductive Technologies” 
(2002) 39:4 Osgoode Hall LJ 771 at 782.  
11  Chambers, supra note 8 at 3. Alberta was the last province to abolish 
the legal status of illegitimacy in Canada; it did so in 1991 (Hilstad 
Estate, [2008] ABQB 570 at para 9). 
12  Charles P Kindregan Jr, “Dead Dads: Thawing an Heir from the 
Freezer” (2009) 35 Wm Mitchell L Rev 433 at 434. 
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one of its biological parents.13 In consequence of recent 
developments in reproductive technology, which enable the 
cryopreservation of human gametes, the concept of a “fertile 
decedent” has, quite literally, sprung to life. While a 
remarkable achievement for reproductive medical science, this 
sui generis category of children “push[es] the bounds of 
existing laws,” creating problems previous generations of 
lawmakers did not need to consider.14 For instance, two 
preliminary questions raised by the complicated nature of the 
conception of after-born children include, firstly, whether or 
not an after-born child can legally be classified as the child of 
his or her deceased biological donor parent, and secondly, if an 
after-born child can legally be classified as the child of a 
decedent, does he or she have the right to inherit from that 
deceased parent’s estate?15 
   
This paper will focus on the inheritance rights of 
posthumously conceived children.16 And, to further narrow its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13  Ibid. 
14  Kristen M Benvenuti Pytel, “Left Out No Longer: A Call for 
Advancement in Legislation for Posthumously Conceived Children” 
(Fall 2009/Winter 2010) 11 JL & Soc’y 70 at 71. 
15  Jenna M F Suppon, “Life After Death: The Need to Address the 
Legal Status of Posthumously Conceived Children” (2010) 48 Fam 
Cts L Rev 228 at 229.  
16  Interestingly, some authors argue that, because the law holds that 
death ends a marriage, it would be reasonable for the law to treat 
posthumously conceived children as if they were non-marital 
children. Browne C. Lewis, for instance, posits that it would “bring 
clarity to the situation because every state has an intestacy statute 
specifically dealing with the inheritance rights of non-marital 
children.” Not a single court or legislature, however, which has 
considered the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, 
has decided to follow that route. Browne C Lewis, “Dead Men 
Reproducing: Responding to the Existence of After Death Children” 
(2009) 16 Geo Mason L Rev 403 at 411.  
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scope, the paper will limit its analysis to [a] fact patterns 
involving women using the cryopreserved sperm of their 
deceased husband or common law partner, [b] situations of 
intestate succession, and [c] the province of Ontario.  
 
To be clear, there are a variety of circumstances in 
which individuals seek to procreate using the gametes of a 
deceased donor. Indeed, posthumous conception fact patterns 
are not exclusively represented by situations whereby a 
recently widowed woman uses the cryopreserved sperm of her 
deceased husband to produce a child. For starters, while the 
practice is remarkably less common, conception can also occur 
by using the preserved egg of a deceased woman.17 For 
instance, there are scenarios involving husbands seeking to 
retrieve the eggs of their wives who are recently “deceased, 
brain-dead, or in a coma or persistent vegetative state.”18 
Furthermore, posthumous conception does not necessarily 
occur in the context of an opposite-sex relationship;19 nor is it 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17  “Egg freezing is a relatively recent scientific breakthrough and is still 
considered experimental. It’s estimated that between 100 to 200 
babies have been born from frozen eggs [worldwide]”. Ruth Zafran, 
“Dying to Be a Father: Legal Paternity in Cases of Posthumous 
Conception” (2007) 8 Houston Journal of Health Law & Policy 47 at 
54-55. 
18  Morgan Kirkland Wood, “It Takes a Village: Considering the Other 
Interests at Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to 
Posthumously Conceived Children” (2010) 44 Ga L Rev 873 at 878. 
“Egg donation is significantly more onerous and dangerous than 
sperm donation because ova can only be retrieved surgically from a 
woman’s ovaries. Further, the difficulties associated with freezing 
ova means that egg donation is generally restricted to fresh ova which 
results in fewer ova and poses greater risk of contracting body-fluid 
bone pathogens, such as HIV”: Angela Cameron, Vanessa Gruben & 
Fiona Kelly, “De-Anonymising Sperm Donors in Canada: Some 
Doubts and Directions” (2010) 26 Can J Fam L 95 at 100. 
19  In 2005, the Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005 c 33 was enacted making it 
possible for same-sex couples across Canada to marry civilly. 
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automatically confined to scenarios where the deceased donor 
was formerly married to or in a common law relationship with 
the individual seeking to use their gametes posthumously.20 In 
fact, for many Canadians, including infertile opposite-sex 
couples, same-sex couples, and single women, anonymous 
sperm donation constitutes the primary method for establishing 
a family.21 
 
The decision to focus exclusively on one fact pattern, 
namely, women conceiving children with the sperm of their 
deceased husband or common law partner — in other words, a 
known male genetic progenitor — largely reflects three factual 
realities. First, a majority of cases litigated in the context of 
inheritance rights for after-born children to date involve 
women seeking the right to use the sperm of their deceased 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“[S]ame-sex couples are recognized within Canadian family law on 
footing identical to that for opposite-sex couples. . . . Canada’s 
recognition of same-sex couples has put it . . . at the cutting edge of 
family developments”. Robert Leckey, “Families in the Eyes of the 
Law: Contemporary Challenges and the Grip of the Past” (2009) 15:8 
IRPP Choices 44 at 15.  
20  Between the 2001 and 2006 censuses, the number of “unmarried-
couple families grew by nearly one-fifth (18.9%), a rate more than 
five times faster than that for married couples” By 2006, unmarried-
couple families accounted for 15.5% of all census families. Ibid at 13.  
21  Kelly D Jordan, “Annotation: Pratten v. British Columbia (Attorney 
General)” (2011) 99 RFL (6th) 411 at 411. Surrogacy arrangements 
also make it possible for same-sex couples and opposite-sex couples 
to conceive a child posthumously. A surrogacy arrangement involves 
a woman (i.e. the surrogate mother) agreeing to carry a child to term 
for another individual or couple. For instance, a gay couple could rely 
on a surrogate to have a child using a donated egg and one of the 
men’s donated sperm. The laws governing surrogacy are complex in 
Canada and raise a host of legal questions related to posthumously 
conceived children that are beyond the scope of this article. See 
Malcolm Dort, “Unheard Voices: Adoption Narratives of Same-Sex 
Male Couples” (2010) Can J Fam L 289.  
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husband or common law partner to reproduce. Second, there 
are significant gendered differences between sperm and egg 
donation that warrant individualized attention that is not 
possible in a single paper.22 And third, several of the statutes 
thus far enacted which deal explicitly with the inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children incorporate 
conditional language premised on surviving spouses in 
marriage or marriage-like relationships.23 In short, while there 
are a myriad of ways in which after-born children can come 
into this world, the courts and legislatures have 
overwhelmingly been exposed to only one such scenario.24   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22  See Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 18 at 98. 
23  Alberta Law Reform Institute, Succession and Posthumously 
Conceived Children (Report # 23, January 2012) at 17 [ALRI]. 
24  The rights of posthumously conceived children have been considered 
— albeit exceptionally — in scenarios that are different from the 
traditional fact pattern outlined above. For instance, in an 
internationally precedent setting case, an Israeli court ruled that a 
family could extract the eggs from the ovaries of their deceased 
daughter after she was killed in a car accident; the court granted the 
family’s petition to have her eggs harvested and frozen: “Dead Girl’s 
Eggs Can be Taken”, The [Montreal] Gazette (9 August 2011) 
online: <montrealgazette.com>. This decision departs dramatically 
from the posthumous reproduction guidelines published in Israel in 
2003. Indeed, after consulting with medical, legal, bioethics, and 
Jewish law experts, the attorney general established guidelines based 
on the assumption that “a man who lived in a loving relationship with 
a woman would want her to have his genetic child after his death 
even if he never had the opportunity to formally express such a 
desire”: Vardit Ravitsky, “Posthumous Reproduction Guidelines in 
Israel” (2004) 34:2 The Hastings Center Report 6 at 6-7. The 
guidelines limited the approval of posthumous requests to female ex-
partners and denied rights to any other party, including a deceased’s 
parents. Furthermore, the guidelines authorized courts to allow the 
extraction of sperm from the cadaver of a recently deceased man even 
in the absence of his explicit consent. This presumed consent 
guideline was justified on the basis that, as a deceased man, the 
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The other stated analytical restrictions in this paper, 
namely, intestate succession in the province of Ontario, are also 
representative of three factual realities. First, posthumously 
conceived children challenge the definitions of both “child” 
and “issue” under Ontario’s Succession Law Reform Act 
[“SLRA”].25 Second, the entitlement of after-born children to 
take on an intestacy has yet to be litigated in the Ontario 
courts.26 In fact, no court in Canada has yet had the opportunity 
to consider the inheritance rights of after-born children. The 
decision to focus on Ontario, however, is in large part related to 
the author’s desire to examine a single legislative scheme 
comprehensively; statutes and case law outside of Ontario, 
however, including jurisdictions outside of Canada, will 
additionally be examined for comparative purposes. Third, the 
discrimination of children on the basis of birth status has a 
particularly long and fascinating legislative history in Ontario. 
Consequently, by comparing the legal treatment of bastards in 
the previous century with the deprivations potentially to be 
experienced by after-born children today, the paper will anchor 
its discussion of discrimination on the basis of birth status and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
decedent would not be coerced into taking on parental obligations; 
while a posthumously conceived child could be registered legally as 
the child of the deceased, such registration would not entail that he or 
she be entitled to inheritance rights. 
25  Succession Law Reform Act, RSO 1990, c S.26 at s 1.1 [SLRA]. The 
statutory definition of “child” under the SLRA includes, “a child 
conceived before and born alive after the parent’s death”; an “issue” 
includes, “a descendant conceived before and born alive after the 
person’s death.” The implications of the SLRA’s definitions of both 
“child” and “issue” will be discussed at length in Section III, infra 
note 154.   
26  Clare E. Burns & Anastasia Sumakova, “Mission Impossible: Estate 
Planning and Assisted Human Reproduction” (2010) 60 ETR (3d) 59. 
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argue that, absent legislative reform, after-born children will 
unnecessarily be deprived of intestate inheritance rights.27  
 
This paper does not seek to argue, however, that the 
experiences of bastard children in the past are an uncanny 
reflection of those to be had by after-born children today. More 
specifically, despite the parallels that can be drawn between 
bastards and after-born children, the overall analogy is less 
than perfectly compatible and can only be extended so far. In 
fact, in addition to inheritance-related deprivations, 
posthumously conceived children are, by definition, born into 
single-parent or step/blended families — alternative family 
forms, in other words, that are each equipped with their own set 
of social obstacles and legal hurdles.28 The policy implications 
of these barriers, therefore, will also be addressed, albeit briefly 
and tangentially, in this paper. 
 
The paper will begin by introducing posthumous 
conception and outlining the reasons for which it is used 
(Section I). In order to contextualize the discrimination 
potentially faced by after-born children, the paper will follow 
with an examination of [a] the evolution of legislation passed 
in Ontario condemning children born out of wedlock to 
illegitimate status, and [b] the legal deprivations resulting from 
such laws (Section II). The paper will proceed by introducing 
the legislative scheme of the SLRA and addressing the 
definitional legal issues posed by after-born children (Section 
III). The paper will conclude by examining “the sparse case 
law on point, and the few statutes [enacted]” that specifically 
address the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27  Chambers, supra note 8. 
28  Manitoba Law Reform Commission, Posthumously Conceived 
Children: Intestate Succession and Dependents Relief (Report # 118, 
November 2008) at 16 [MLRC]. 
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children;29 it will do so in order to evaluate the various interests 
at stake should Ontario choose to reform the SLRA (Section 
IV).  
 
SECTION I:  
‘DEADBEAT DADS: AFTER-BORN CHILDREN AND 
CREATING LIFE FROM THE GRAVE 
 
After-born children are created through unconventional means, 
brought up in non-traditional family structures, and confront 
statutory regimes that never anticipated the likelihood of their 
existence. The following section, as a result, seeks to provide 
background information on the circumstances that made it 
possible for deceased biological donor parents to create life 
from their graves. Specifically, this section will consider: [a] 
the origins of cryopreservation, [b] the definition of an after-
born child, and [c] the families in which posthumously 
conceived children are born into. 
 
The Origins of Cryopreservation  
 
On January 26th, 2003, as war with Iraq loomed and thousands 
of American soldiers were preparing to be deployed to the 
Middle East, USA Today published an article describing a 
modern-day, unconventional pre-departure ritual of the troops, 
namely, banking their sperm before shipping out:30  
 
[Some soldiers] say it's fear of infertility, not 
death, that [leads] them to a room in a cryonics 
lab, where they produc[e] semen [. . .] [to be] 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Morgan Kirkland Wood, “It Takes a Village: Considering the Other 
Interests at Stake When Extending Inheritance Rights to 
Posthumously Conceived Children” (2010) 44 Ga L Rev 873 at 880. 
30  Valerie Alvord, “Some Troops Freeze Sperm Before Deploying”, 
USA Today (27 January 2003) 1A at 1A. 
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frozen in liquid nitrogen. The men must 
designate who will take custody of the sperm in 
the event of their death.31 
 
For many soldiers, the fear of exposure to chemical or 
biological weapons, and its potential harm on their 
reproductive systems, served as the catalyst for visiting a sperm 
bank and freezing their semen before deployment.32 
Cryopreservation — or, the assisted reproductive technology 
method of freezing sperm in nitrogen — has made it possible 
for men to preserve their genetic material for subsequent use.33 
Changing traditional conceptions of the order of steps required 
for human procreation, the process of cryopreservation was 
only successfully performed for the first time in 1949.34 
 
Men have been freezing their sperm for decades. 
Indeed, after scientific experiments determined that [a] the 
addition of a small amount of glycerol before freezing would 
increase the survival rate of sperm, and [b] sperm could be 
preserved for tens, possibly hundreds of years, the scientific 
community began recommending that widows use their 
husbands’ frozen sperm to produce children if they were killed 
in battle.35 In the 1960s, the cryopreservation of sperm was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Ibid.  
32 Kindregan Jr, supra note 12 at 436. Soldiers are not the only men 
who bank their sperm; additional candidates include, but are not 
limited to, cancer patients whose treatments may render them sterile 
or athletes predisposed to groin injuries.  
33  Robert Matthew Harper, “Dead Hand Problem: Why New York’s 
Estates, Powers and Trusts Law Should be Amended to Treat 
Posthumously Conceived Children as Decedents’ Issue and 
Descendants” (2008) 21 Quinnipiac Prob LJ 267 at 270. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Sheri Gilbert, “Fatherhood from the Grave: An Analysis of 
Postmortem Insemination” (1993) 22 Hofstra L Rev 521 at 525. The 
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made available to Apollo astronauts, thus ensuring the 
possibility of fathering healthy children from space should their 
missions have detrimental consequences on their bodies. 
Interestingly, the activity at sperm banks significantly increases 
during times of war. For instance, during the Vietnam War, US 
soldiers sent their frozen sperm back to their wives with the 
expectation of being fathers upon their arrival home. 
Furthermore, soldier requests for the cryopreservation of sperm 
during the Persian Gulf War was also remarkable.36 Most of 
these men intended on using the sperm themselves in the future 
in order to continue the genetic line of their respective 
families.37 
 
What happens, however, if a man dies and his widow 
or girlfriend wishes to procreate using the sperm of her 
deceased partner? This problem has actually been discussed in 
legal academia for over forty years.38 For instance, in 1962, W. 
Barton Leach, a law professor at Harvard University, predicted 
that the “new phenomenon of sperm banks, created to protect 
the issue of astronauts from mutations caused by ionizing 
radiation in space,” would threaten the common law rule 
against perpetuities.39 Indeed, because sperm could potentially 
be preserved for an indefinite period, Professor Leach 
anticipated that nothing would prevent an astronaut’s widow 
from conceiving a child “long after a life in being plus twenty-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
origins of cryopreservation date back to the 1770s. In was only in 
1866, however, when an Italian scientist, Paolo Mantegazza, 
discovered that sperm could withstand freezing. In 1949, the 
cryopreservation process became successful. 
36  Ibid at 525-526. 
37  Kristine S Knaplund, “Postmortem Conception and a Father’s Last 
Will” (2004) 46 Ariz L Rev 91 at 92.  
38  Ibid.  
39  Ibid. 
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one years, thus invalidating bequests that once would have 
been routinely upheld.”40 Almost prophetically, Professor 
Leach’s predication came true: fifteen years after the 
publication of his article, The Sydney Morning Herald reported 
that a widow had successfully given birth to a child using the 
cryopreserved sperm of her deceased husband.41  
 
A man cryopreserving his sperm does not necessarily 
imply that he wants children postmortem; indeed, the freezing 
of sperm is used for a variety of reasons and in a multitude of 
circumstances.42 In some instances, the unforeseeable death of 
a loved one can create a situation whereby sperm becomes 
available and the deceased donor, as a result, does not 
anticipate or consent to his genetic material being used 
posthumously.43 In other situations, however, a biological 
donor parent will have explicitly consented to the use of his 
frozen sperm. For instance, if a man is seriously ill, he might 
authorize a particular person to use his sperm to produce a 
child. The above examples elucidate the complex and 
multifaceted reasons for which sperm is frozen. The instances 
in which an after-born child is the resulting product of 
conception, however, are more exhaustively defined in law. 
Consequently, it is important to elaborate on the qualifying 
criteria of a posthumously conceived child.44 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  W Barton Leach, “Perpetuities in the Atomic Age: The Sperm Bank 
and the Fertile Decedent” (1962) 48 ABA J 942 at 943.   
41  Sydney Morning Herald (July 12th, 1977), cited in Carolyn 
Sappideen, “Life After Death — Sperm Banks, Wills and 
Perpetuities” (1979) 53 Austl L J 311 at 311. 
42  Supra note 32. 
43  Kindregan Jr, supra note 12 at 436 
44  Ibid at 434-5. 
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Defining After-Born Children 
 
For the purposes of this paper, an after-born child is defined as 
someone who is conceived after the death of one of its 
biological donor parents; this definition excludes: [1] a 
pretermitted child who was born or adopted after the execution 
of a will,45 and [2] a child who is conceived through sexual 
intercourse during the lifetime of its biological donor parent but 
is not born until after the biological donor parent’s death.46 
Scenarios in which a biological donor father impregnates a 
woman during his lifetime and the resulting child is born 
subsequent to his death do not raise the same kinds of legal 
issues as using the cryopreserved sperm of a deceased man to 
conceive children.47 Consequently, the remainder of this paper 
will focus on the legal questions posed by children that have 
been conceived after the death of a biological donor parent, 
namely, the father, via reproductive technology. 
 
There are currently no statistics available on the 
number of women who have conceived and given birth to a 
posthumously conceived child; nor is there any available data 
on the number of women who plan to do so in the future.48 It is 
possible, however, to deduce the number of successfully 
conceived after-born children by examining, first, advances in 
reproductive technology that have facilitated the occurrence of 
posthumous conception, and second, the number of requests for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  SLRA, supra note 25. Section 1.1 provides that a “child” includes, “a 
child conceived before and born alive after the parent’s death”. Thus, 
a child in gestation who so qualifies is the legal heir of its parent even 
if that parent dies prior to the child’s birth (emphasis added).   
46  By definition, a child conceived through sexual intercourse is not a 
child of assisted reproduction. Kindregan Jr, supra note 12 at 434-
435.  
47  Ibid at 435.  
48  Knaplund, supra note 37 at 93.  
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sperm after men have died.49 For instance, since the availability 
of cryopreservation in the 1940s, it has become a common 
practice. In fact, in 1999, 99% of clinics reporting to the 
Centers for Disease Control in the United States offered 
cryopreservation as an assisted method of reproductive 
technology for patients;50 in 1988, however, only 74% of 
clinics did so.51 Furthermore, the number of requests to harvest 
the sperm of a dead man is also an indicative measurement of 
the number of children conceived posthumously; indeed, 
requests to preserve the sperm of a dead man only occur when 
an after-born child is desired.52 Consequently, the fact that, 
between 1980 and 1995, forty fertility clinics reported a total of 
eighty-two requests being made for the postmortem retrieval of 
sperm — with over 50% of those requests being made in 1995 
— is probative of its progressive prevalence.53 In short, the 
freezing of sperm for the purposes of posthumous conception is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Ibid.  
50  Centers for Disease Control, 1999 National Report on Assisted 
Reproductive Technology Success Rates, online: <http://www.cdc.go 
v/reproductivehealth/ART99/index99.htm> at 57.  
51  US Gen Acct Office Rep to the Chairman, Subcomm on Regulation, 
Bus Opportunities & Energy, Common on Small Bus, HR, Doc No 
90-24, Dec 1989 at 32.  
52  Knaplund, supra note 37 at 93.  
53  Susan Kerr, “Post-Mortem Sperm Procurement: Is it Legal?” (1999) 3 
DePaul J Health Care L 39 at 45. Not all fertility clinics, however, 
permitted the use of frozen sperm by a widow or girlfriend after a 
man’s death. For instance, a 1998 survey of 324 assisted reproductive 
technology clinics determined that 45% of responding clinics 
prohibited the posthumous use of sperm to conceive a child; thirty-
five percent of clinics, by contrast, allowed such use: Judy Stern et al, 
“Access to Services at Assisted Reproductive Technology Clinics: A 
Survey of Policies and Practices” [2001] 184 American Journal of 
Obstetrics and Gynecology 591 at 595.  
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not the science of tomorrow and will likely become more 
common with each passing year.54 
 
Despite the increasing prevalence of successfully 
conceived after-born children, the barriers to posthumous 
conception are significant.55 More specifically, after obtaining 
frozen sperm, three obstacles remain: [1] the use of frozen 
sperm over fresh sperm is accompanied by a drop in the 
number of viable sperm;56 [2] cost; and [3] problems related to 
proving paternity.57 First, the use of frozen semen requires the 
assistance of some type of reproductive technique.58 And, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  Benjamin C Carpenter, “A Chip Off the Old Iceblock: How 
Cryopreservation Has Changed Estate Law, Why Attempts to 
Address the Issue Have Fallen Short, And How to Fix It” (2011)  21 
Cornell JL & Pub Pol’y 347 at 350. “Today, researchers estimate that 
over 30,000 children are born each year who were conceived from 
frozen sperm, and almost 29,000 in vitro fertilization transfers each 
year use frozen embryos”. 
55  “The best evidence we have that postmortem conception has occurred 
is the babies themselves. Newspapers . . . repor[t] . . . instances of 
successful pregnancies using a deceased man’s sperm. . . . [C]ourt 
cases have addressed the issue of whether children conceived after 
their fathers’ deaths are entitled to inherit in intestacy and thus 
eligible to receive Social Security benefits”. Knaplund, supra note 37 
at 92-93.   
56  MC Schiewe et al, “Cryopreservation of Intact Testis Biopsies for 
ICSI” (1997) 68 Supp Fertility & Sterility 115. The article cited a 
study that demonstrated that, when sperm was cryopreserved without 
preliminary processing, only 30% survived freezing and thawing.  
57  Knaplund, supra note 37 at 96.  
58  An assisted reproductive technique is a requirement of successful 
posthumous conception because the sperm must be “thawed, 
rehydrated, and cleansed prior to insemination”. Emily McAllister, 
“Defining the Parent-Child Relationship in an Age of Reproductive 
Technology: Implications for Inheritance” (1994) 29 Real Prop Prob 
& Tr J 55 at 63.   
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reproductive technique that most often accompanies 
cryopreservation, for instance, is artificial insemination. 
Artificial insemination using frozen sperm, however, has a 
success rate of between 8% and 10%; using fresh sperm, by 
contrast, yields a success rate of between 16% and 18%.59 The 
second obstacle, namely, cost, refers to the expensive nature of 
procedures such as artificial insemination. One cycle of 
artificial insemination can cost anywhere between $300 - $700; 
most women undergo 3 to 6 cycles before successfully 
becoming pregnant or trying another technique, including in 
vitro fertilization [“IVF”].60  
 
The complexity and multifaceted nature of the third 
barrier, specifically, obstacles to proving paternity, is well 
beyond the scope of this paper. As a precursor to Section II, 
however, on the evolution of bastardy laws in Ontario, certain 
issues related to legal presumptions of paternity are deserving 
of the reader’s attention. Consequently, the paper will briefly 
address why historical approaches to paternity are important 
considerations in the context of posthumous conception. 
 
The belief that biological relatedness is at the center of 
all parent-child relationships justifies how categories of 
filiation are organized in law. Indeed, the legal category of 
paternity is understood to provide the “quintessential 
illustration of the relationship between natural facts, social 
construction, and legal ideology.”61 For instance, before the 
advent of genetic testing, it was impossible to determine with 
any certitude the exact biological relationship between a father 
and his child. Consequently, legal presumptions of paternity 
consciously rectified this “lack of certainty in the biological 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59  Knaplund, supra note 37 at 96.  
60  Ibid at 97.  
61  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 779. 
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reality of paternity.”62 More specifically, at common law, a 
man’s legal connection to a child’s mother established his 
biological connection to a child in law. In other words, 
according to the still-existent maxim pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant — or, by marriage the father is demonstrated — a 
man was assumed to be the father of a child if he was married 
to that child’s mother when she gave birth; no evidence was 
required to establish the paternity of a child born within the 
sanctity of marriage.63  
 
Paternity by presumption — fittingly referred to as 
“the legal fiction of biological fatherhood in marriage”64 — 
serves to maintain normative beliefs regarding the naturalness 
of physical intimacy when it is confined to the sacred 
monogamous relationship of husband and wife in marriage.65 
What the paternity presumption also reveals, however, is the 
extent to which the “idea of ‘nature’ has come to mean 
‘biology’; therefore, the idea of relatedness, has, to a large 
extent, been ‘biologized.’”66 In the context of paternity by 
presumption, after-born children are legal enigmas; they 
simultaneously undermine normative societal beliefs that the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62  T Caulfield, “Paternity Testing in the Genetic Era” (1996) 17 Health 
L Can 19 at 21.  
63  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 780. The maxim pater est quem nuptiae 
demonstrant is codified in law; for instance, s 8.1.1 of the Ontario 
Children’s Law Reform Act states, “[u]nless the contrary is proven on 
a balance of probabilities, there is a presumption that a male person 
is, and he shall be recognized in law to be, the father of a child in any 
one of the following circumstances: (1) The person is married to the 
mother of the child at the time of the birth of the child.” RSO 1990, c 
C.12 [CLRA]. 
64  S Sevenhuijsen, “The Gendered Juridification of Parenthood” (1992) 
1 Soc & Leg Stud 71 at 74.  
65  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 781. 
66  Caulfield, supra note 62 at 20.  
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law seeks to preserve against the facts of biology, while 
buttressing the belief that biological relatedness is the essence 
of the parent-child relationship.67 More specifically, because 
marriage ends at death, a posthumously conceived child will 
never technically be a child born within a marriage.68 Put in 
another way, from a legal perspective, an after-born child is, by 
definition, born into an alternative family structure that 
diverges from the traditionally sanctified model outlined above 
— and this, irrespective of the fact that after-born children are 
often the product of two people who were in a marriage or 
marriage-like relationship.69 
 
The Families of the After-Born 
 
The conception of an after-born child ultimately depends on the 
death of one of its biological donor parents. An after-born 
child’s life, in consequence, is contingent upon him or her 
joining one of two non-traditional family forms, namely, [1] a 
one-parent family [“OPF”], and [2] a step/blended family.70  
Thus, in addition to inheritance-related deprivations elaborated 
upon in depth in Sections III and IV of this paper, after-born 
children are born into alternative family structures that are each 
equipped with their own set of structural and legal 
disadvantages. More specifically, because both OPFs and 
step/blended families represent categories of relationships that 
are often at odds with — or that have outpaced — existing 
legal frameworks for families, after-born children are born into 
a life ascribed by one of the quintessential contemporary family 
law challenges of today, namely, balancing “intention to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 781. 
68  Wood, supra note 29 at 878. 
69  MLRC, supra note 28 at 16. 
70  Ibid. 
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become a parent, [and] the social fact of having given care and 
genetic links to a child.” 71 
 
The first non-traditional family form of interest, 
namely, OPFs, are created in the following descending order of 
frequency: (1) A couple separates after a cohabitation or a 
marriage and one of the ex-spouses has physical custody of the 
children; (2) a woman gives birth to a child and does not live 
with the child’s father or any other partner, male or female;72 
(3) a father or a mother is widowed; and (4) a single (divorced, 
never-married, or widowed) man or woman adopts a child.73  
 
Given the variety of circumstances in which a OPF can 
come into existence, it is not surprising that this family model 
is of particular interest in public policy debates. Indeed, in 
addition to challenging Canadian values which continue to 
dictate, firstly, that children should be raised by two people, 
and secondly, that these parents should be married — or, at a 
very minimum, cohabiting — OPFs differ from the normative 
two-parent family model in other significant ways, including 
their higher poverty rate, dependence on welfare, and in their 
children’s social outcomes.74 Furthermore, while only a 
minority of Canadian families fall into the OPF structure, most 
are headed by lone female parents. In fact, in 2006, 15.9% of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71  Leckey, supra note 19 at 21.  
72  Anne-Marie Ambert, Contemporary Family Trends: One Parent 
Families: Characteristics, Causes, Consequences, and Issues 
(Ottawa: The Vanier Institute of the Family, 2006) at 5 [Ambert]. The 
author refers here to non-conjugal births . 
73  Ibid. In official statistics, however, such families are generally 
included in category (2). 
74  Ibid.  
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Canadian families identified themselves as a OPF; of the 
15.9% OPFs accounted for, 12.7% were headed by women.75 
 
Coined in the 1970s, the term “feminization of 
poverty” refers to the overwhelming concentration of poverty 
among women, particularly in female-headed households.76 As 
a lived reality, the feminization of poverty represents more than 
a lack of income or state of financial need for women; rather, it 
additionally implies “the absence of choice, the denial of 
opportunity, the inability to achieve life goals, and ultimately, 
the loss of hope.”77 In 2007, approximately 1.22 million 
women aged 18 or older were living in poverty in Canada.78 
Women who are lone-parent heads of families, however, “have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
75  Anne Milan, Mireille Vézina & Carrie Wells, Family Portrait: 
Continuity and Change in Canadian Families and Households in 
2006 (Ottawa: Statistics Canada, 2007) at 8, 15. In 2001, there were 
1,311,190 OPFs in Canada; of those families, 1,065,360 were headed 
by female parents. In 2006, there were 1,414,060 OPFs in Canada; of 
those families, 1,132,290 were headed by female parents. Between 
2001 and 2006, OPFs in Canada grew by 7.8%.  
76  Monica Townson, Women’s Poverty and the Recession (Ottawa: 
Canadian Centre for Policy Alternatives, 2009) at 10. Gender creates 
a cleavage that cuts across all groups marginalized in Canada, 
including women from racialized communities, immigrants, 
Aboriginals, and women with disabilities. 
77  Megan Thibos, Danielle Lavin-Loucks & Marcus Martin, The 
Feminization of Poverty (Dallas: J Macdonald Williams Institute, 
2007) at 1. The United Nations has similarly defined poverty much 
more broadly than simply a lack of income. Specifically, the United 
Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has 
defined poverty as follows: “[A] human condition characterized by 
the sustained or chronic deprivation of the resources, capabilities, 
choices, security and power necessary for the enjoyment of an 
adequate standard of living and other civil, cultural, economic, 
political and social rights” (Townson, supra note 76 at 10).   
78  Townson, supra note 76 at 10. 
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one of the highest poverty rates of any group within Canada’s 
population.”79 In 2009, female lone-parents’ incomes were, on 
average, $7,500 below the poverty line; the incidence of low 
income among these families was nearly five times as high as 
that of two-parent families with children.80 The causes of 
poverty among women in lone-parent households are 
understandably complex; their roots, however, can be located 
“in the way [women] are treated when they are in paid 
employment and the situation in which they find themselves if 
they are outside paid employment.”81 
 
More women are working in the paid labour force than 
ever before; their rate of participation, however, has not been 
accompanied by wage parity with men,82 nor has it been 
buttressed by adequate income support and social services.83 
For starters, in the last six years alone, women have seen [1] 
the right to pay equity at the federal public service level 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79  Ibid at 28. 
80  Statistics Canada, Income in Canada (Ottawa: Statistics Canada 
Catalogue no 75-202-XIE, 2009). The “poverty line” in this context is 
based on the Low-Income Cut-Offs [“LICOs”] calculated by 
Statistics Canada. LICOs represent an income threshold where a 
family is likely to spend 20% more of its income on food, shelter and 
clothing than the average family, leaving less income available for 
other expenses such as health, education, transportation and 
recreation. 
81  Townson, supra note 76 at 6. 
82  Ibid. Women’s wages still lag far behind men: “In 2008, for example, 
82% of women in the age group 25 to 44 . . . were in the paid work 
force. But women earned only 65.7% of the average earnings of men 
. . . . That’s almost no improvement over where they were 10 years 
earlier in 1998 when they earned 62.8% of the average earnings of 
men”.  
83  Ibid at 25. 
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restricted,84 [2] the reneging of signed agreements between the 
federal and provincial governments to establish a national 
system of early learning and child care,85 and [3] the 
termination of research activities at Status of Women Canada 
— an agency with the explicit mandate of promoting women’s 
equality.86 Indeed, Ontario itself has witnessed the expiration, 
and subsequent non-renewal, of $63 million worth of federal 
funding supporting 22,000 child care spaces in the province.87 
Furthermore, few provinces in Canada have programs directly 
aimed at ameliorating poverty for women who head OPFs.88 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  Ibid. The Public Sector Equitable Compensation Act makes 
employers and bargaining agents jointly accountable for ensuring 
equitable compensation through established wage-setting practices, 
rather than through a separate pay equity process or through a 
complaint-based litigation. Critics of the amendment argue that it 
undermines the principle that pay equity is a right: Aaron Wherry, “Is 
this the Quiet End to Pay Equity?” Maclean’s (21 February 2009), 
online: Macleans.ca <http://www.macleans.ca>. 
85  Ibid at 24. In 2004, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development released a report that described Canada’s child care 
system as a “chronically underfunded patchwork of programs with no 
overarching goals.” In fact, the report ranked Canada last among 
developed countries with respect to [1] access to early learning and 
child care spaces, and [2] public investment. Furthermore, the report 
concluded that there was a “shortage of available regulated child care 
spaces — enough for fewer than 20% of children aged six and 
younger with working parents”. 
86  Ibid at 8. See also Susan Boyd, Margot Young, Gwen Brodksy & 
Shelagh Day, Poverty: Rights, Social Citizenship, and Legal Activism 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007). The authors discuss how, in recent 
years, Canadians have seen the retrenchment of social programs and 
the restructuring of the welfare state along neo-liberal lines. At both 
the federal and provincial level, social programs “have been cut back, 
eliminated, or recast in exclusionary and punitive forms”. 
87  Ibid at 5. The provincial government contributed $18 million to save 
as many as 9,000 child care spaces.  
88  Ibid at 29. 
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For instance, while “[m]any jurisdictions seems to believe 
federal and provincial child benefits are a good way of 
addressing the poverty of [female-headed OPFs],” the National 
Council of Welfare points out that a majority of welfare 
families with children have seen little improvement in total 
income — and this, irrespective of the fact that the federal 
government has increased its spending on child benefits 
dramatically since 1998.89 
 
Children are poor because their parents are poor; for 
those living in OPFs, however, additional obstacles are 
ascribed to the family structure.90 For instance, it has been 
documented that children living in OPFs are more likely than 
children living with two parents to: [1] exhibit behavioural 
problems, including hyperactivity, aggressiveness, fighting, 
and hostility; [2] do less well and stay less long in school; and 
[3] be unemployed and do less well economically as an adult.91 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89  Ibid. According to the National Council of Welfare, when adjusted 
for inflation, the majority of welfare incomes peaked in 1994 or 
earlier. “When the peak-year welfare incomes were compared with 
2006 welfare incomes, some of the losses were staggering . . . . In 
Ontario, for example, a lone parent’s income decreased by over 
$5,900”.  
90  Ibid at 11. 
91  Ambert, supra note 72 at 15. To serve as an important contrast, an 
interesting study published in 2010 found that children raised by 
lesbian mothers — whether the mother was partnered or single — 
scored very similarly to children raised by opposite-sex parents on 
measures of development and social behavior. Between 1986 and 
1992, Nanette Gartrell and Henny Bos studied the children of 154 
planned lesbian families from their conception until they reached 
adulthood. The researchers observed: “[T]he 17-year-old daughters 
and sons of lesbian mothers were rated significantly higher in social, 
school/academic, and total competence and significantly lower in 
social problems, rule-breaking, aggressive, and externalizing problem 
behavior than their age-matched counterparts [raised in families 
consisting of opposite-sex parents]”: Nanette Gartrell & Henny Bos, 
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Interestingly, OPFs resulting from the death of a parent are 
identified as having mitigated negative economic consequences 
because, similar to two-parent families, they gain access to 
survivor benefits, life insurance, pension plans, and other 
inheritance-related assets.92 However, for reasons discussed 
later in this paper, it remains unclear in Canada whether after-
born children have the right to access any of the above-listed 
benefits in situations of intestate succession.93  
 
On top of the structural vulnerabilities outlined above, 
single mother-led OPFs must additionally confront the larger 
political and social discourse of “children needing a ‘father’ or 
‘father figure’ in order to thrive.”94 Indeed, reticent to 
recognize the right of women to parent alone, courts in Canada 
have been willing to insert a father figure, including known 
sperm donors, into a single mother’s household “in order to 
create a dyadic nuclear family.”95 For instance, in the 1997 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
“US National Longitudinal Lesbian Family Study: Psychological 
Adjustment of 17-Year-Old Adolescents” (2010) 126:1 Pediatrics 1 at 
1.  
92  Ibid at 7.  
93  Section III, infra note 154; Section IV, infra note 186. 
94  Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 18 at 120. 
95  Ibid at 122. Outside of a few provinces in Canada, there is currently a 
lack of legislation in the country addressing the legal parentage of 
children born via sperm donation. In consequence of this legislative 
void, it is not clear who a child’s legal parents might be in the assisted 
reproductive context. Without the protection of the law, “[f]amilies 
are particularly concerned that . . . donors might intervene in their 
established relationships and pose a threat to their family security”: 
Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 18 at 108. In Alberta, the 
Family Law Act explicitly states that a sperm donor who is not in a 
“relationship of interdependence of some permanence” with a female 
person does not enjoy the legal status of a parent to the resulting 
offspring conceived using his sperm; SA c F-4.5 at s 13:3. Similarly, 
in Quebec, section 538.2 of the Civil Code states that, “the 
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Alberta Court of Appeal decision, Johnston-Steeves v Lee, a 
man was awarded extensive access rights to a child against the 
wishes of a single mother by choice, and irrespective of the fact 
that the mother characterized the man as nothing more than a 
known sperm donor.96 Furthermore, in a string of cases coming 
out of the province of Quebec, a number of non-biological, 
social lesbian mothers were denied legal parenting rights “due 
to the presence or the actions of a known donor.”97 Indeed, 
with the underlying assumption being that a father figure 
inserted into a woman-headed family is better than no father 
figure at all, the Quebec Court of Appeal in A v B, C and X 
designated a known sperm donor as a child’s father to the 
exclusion of the biological lesbian mother’s former partner, the 
non-biological, social lesbian mother.98 In this case, the sperm 
donor had minimal contact with the child and candidly 
acknowledged his role as a donor — not a father — of the 
child. The lesbian social mother, by contrast, who actively 
raised the child from birth, was not awarded parental rights.99 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contribution of genetic material for the purposes of a third-party 
parental project does not create any bond of filiation between the 
contributor and the child born of the parental project”; SQ 1991, c 64 
[CCQ]. The Alberta and Quebec provisions apply to opposite-sex and 
same-sex couples who produce a child via assisted human 
reproductive technology.   
96  Johnston-Steeves v Lee (1997), 33 RFL (4th) 278 (CA) at para 19, 
[1998] 3 WWR 410. The Court of Appeal rejected the mother’s s 7 
claim that she had a right under the Canadian Charter of Human 
Rights and Freedoms to decide what type of family she would create 
in order to raise her child: “We reject the suggestion that s.7 creates a 
right for the custodial parent to decide on a family model which 
excludes the other parent f[ro]m the life of the child, especially where 
such a model is inconsistent with the best interests of the child”. 
97  Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 18 at 124. 
98  [2007] JQ no 1896, 2007 RDF 217. 
99  Cameron, Gruben & Kelly, supra note 18 at 126-7. See also S.G. v 
L.C., [2004] RJQ 1685, [2004] RDF 517 (Sup Ct) and L.O. v S.J., 
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In Canada, a man who is not the biological donor 
parent of a child conceived using assisted reproductive 
technologies may also acquire status as a legal parent.100 
Indeed, in certain circumstances, namely, in step/blended 
families — the second non-traditional family structure of 
interest in this section — a man may be awarded parental rights 
and be held liable for its accompanying obligations. 
Step/blended families are the product of adults re-partnering 
and bringing children from previous relationships into a new 
family structure.101 More specifically, a stepfamily is created 
when a single parent begins living with, or marries, an 
individual or another single parent. Men and women can enter 
stepfamilies as a stepparent, a biological parent, or both, and 
through a number of different pathways. A blended family is a 
subcategory of stepfamily; it generally refers to stepfamilies 
with a common child. For many individuals, becoming a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
[2006] JQ No 450, [2006] RJQ 775 (Sup Ct). The holding in A v B, C 
and X is arguably inconsistent with the current state of the law in 
Quebec. Importantly, Quebec is one of the few provinces in Canada 
to have explicitly addressed the parental status of social lesbian 
mothers in lesbian families created in the assisted reproductive 
context. For instance, s 539.1 of the CCQ provides that where both 
parents are women, “the rights and obligations assigned by law to the 
father, insofar as they differ from the mother's, are assigned to the 
mother who did not give birth to the child,” CCQ, supra note 95. 
Similar provisions exist in Nova Scotia (Children’s Act, RSY 2002, c 
31 at s 13), Newfoundland and Labrador (Children’s Law Act, RSNL 
1990, c C-13 at s 12(6)), and the Yukon (Children’s Act, RSY 2002, c 
31 at s 13). In Nova Scotia, for instance, the Birth Registration 
Regulations state that, where a child is conceived through assisted 
reproductive technologies, the spouse of the mother is deemed to be 
the child’s other parent. The term “spouse” is gender neutral and 
seemingly applies to either a male or female partner. 
100  Ibid at 106. 
101  Ibid at 11. 
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stepparent is the first time experiencing both conjugal and 
parental life.102 In 2006, there were over half a million 
stepfamilies in Canada; a majority of this group was comprised 
of a couple and the mother’s children.103 
 
If an after-born child is not born into a OPF, he or she 
is likely already a member of — or will eventually join — a 
step/blended family. Despite the obvious financial benefits for 
children of living in a family with two potential income 
earners, step/blended families come equipped with their own 
unique set of economic and social issues.104 For instance, 
empirical studies have demonstrated that the relationship 
between stepparents and their stepchildren are perceived to be 
of inferior quality as compared with those of biological parents 
and their children; stepfathers in particular are often more 
detached from a child than a biological parent.105 Furthermore, 
in the context of after-born children, it is particularly 
interesting that a stepparent is more likely to take on a parental 
role if his or her stepchild infrequently has contact with the 
non-residential biological parent. Given the absolute 
impossibility of an-after born child having a relationship with 
— let alone seeing on a frequent basis — his or her deceased 
non-residential biological donor parent, it might be easier for a 
stepparent to form a relationship with an after-born child. This 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  Heather Juby, Céline Le Bourdais & Nicole Marcil-Gratton, A Step 
Further: Parenthood in Blended Families (Montreal: Centre 
interuniversitaire d’études démographiques, 2001) at 1. 
103  Statistics Canada, General Social Survey (Ottawa: StatsCan, 2006). 
104  Carol Rogerson, “The Child Support Obligations of Step-Parents” 
(2001) 18 Can J Fam L 9 at 21. Stepfathers’ contribution to 
household incomes generally raises the overall standard of living of a 
household and improves children’s material well-being. 
105  Ibid. The author concedes that statistical differences are “admittedly 
small and many step-parents and step-children do form positive 
relationships that are meaningful and important”. 
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factor might work against stepparents, however, should they 
ever find themselves in court after the dissolution of their 
step/blended family and not wanting to pay child support for 
their (after-born) stepchild.106 
 
In Chartier v. Chartier [“Chartier”], the Supreme 
Court of Canada [“SCC”] was asked to determine whether a 
person, having stood in the place of a parent during the course 
of a marriage, could unilaterally terminate the relationship.107 
The implications of the decision extend beyond the fact that the 
SCC answered this question in the negative. Indeed, Chartier 
carries “broader implications for the way in which the social 
roles and obligations of step-parents are conceived.”108 More 
specifically, the SCC articulated multiple factors to be taken 
into consideration when deciding whether or not a stepparent 
should be ordered to pay child support after the dissolution of a 
step/blended family. One factor, namely, the nature or 
existence of the child's relationship with the absent biological 
parent, is of particular significance for after-born children:109 
 
The cases involving absent biological fathers 
reveal a pattern of courts wanting not just to 
ensure adequate financial provision for children, 
but also to provide replacement social fathers for 
children whose biological fathers have 
abandoned them [or died]. . . . [Cases such as 
Chartier] are informed by pervasive cultural 
assumptions of "normal" families consisting of 
children with one mother and one father, and 
judges appear eager to label as a father any male 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106  Ibid at 64. 
107  Chartier v Chartier, [1999] 1 SCR 242, 168 DLR (4th) 540 [Chartier 
cited to SCR]. 
108  Rogerson, supra note 104 at 64. 
109  Chartier, supra note 107 at para 39. 
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who steps into a situation where children have 
no apparent father.110 
 
In summary, after-born children are born into one of 
two non-traditional family models that each comes equipped 
with its own set of social and legal vulnerabilities. As a 
member of either a female-led OPF or step/blended family, 
after-born children risk exposure to structural disadvantages 
ranging from limited financial resources to a detached parental 
figure. After-born children have no control over the way in 
which they come into this world. They are not the only group 
of children, however, who have borne the burden of the 
ascribed traits of their family structure in Canadian history. 
Indeed, children born out of wedlock in Canada similarly 
confronted deprivations resulting from the manner in which 
they were conceived.111 Consequently, before moving on to 
inheritance-related issues for the after-born in Ontario, the 
following section will examine how historical-legal 
constructions of the parent-child relationship resulted in real 
disabilities for a particular group of children in this country. 
More specifically, in an effort to demonstrate how the after-
born in Ontario will be deprived of fundamental legal rights on 
the basis of their parents’ relationship, the following section 
will argue that, in certain circumstances, parallels can be drawn 
between the experiences of bastard children in the past and 
those to be had by posthumously conceived children today.112 It 
will do so by examining [a] the filius nullius rule, and [b] 





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110  Rogerson, supra note 104 at 103-4. 
111  Chambers, supra note 8. 
112  Leckey, supra note 19 at 19. 
178 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 27, 2011] 
	  
SECTION II:  
THE ORIGINAL BASTARD: ASSESSING THE 
EVOLUTION OF ILLEGITIMACY LAWS IN ONTARIO 
 
The origin of laws condemning children born out of wedlock to 
illegitimate status in Ontario — and Canada at large — find 
their roots in England.113 While in the ancient world problems 
of illegitimacy were resolved by eradicating the problem at its 
source, namely, killing the mother carrying a bastard so as to 
avoid “[q]uestions and difficulties about guardianship, custody 
and property of illegitimate children,”114 the common law of 
England instead chose to punish and ostracize bastard children 
with the legal designation of ‘illegitimate’; the debilitating 
social and economic consequences of the label, consequently, 
reflect the legislative bargain made by the state in 
acknowledgment of the bastard’s illicit existence.115   
 
The Filius Nullius Rule 
 
As stated in the introduction of this paper, the child born to an 
unwed mother was considered the child of nobody at common 
law.116 Indeed, in 1857, William Blackstone asserted that, “the 
incapacity of a bastard consists principally in this, that he 
cannot be heir to any one, neither can he have heirs, but of his 
own body.”117 At law, in other words, illegitimate children had 
no legal relations and few rights. For instance, because bastards 
could not legally belong to a lineage, they could also not 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113  Chambers, supra note 8 at 15. 
114  Teichman, supra note 5 at 53. 
115  Chambers, supra note 8 at 3. 
116  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 781. 
117  Blackstone, supra note 9 at 459.  
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logically be affixed with a legal surname.118 Furthermore, 
bastards “could not establish future biological lineage,”119 and, 
as a result of being kin to nobody, they also had “no ancestors 
from whom any inheritable blood could be derived.”120 
Consequently, given that bastards were not allowed to have any 
inheritable blood in them, they were not eligible to inherit from 
their parents nor could they make claims on their parents for 
support. In fact, succession statutes presumptively treated the 
word ‘child’ as applying only to children born to married 
parents.121 In short, society transformed the illegitimate child 
into a “scapegoat and visited upon it [a] life long brand.”122 
 
England’s first legislative attempt at regulating the 
rights of bastard children can be found in her Poor Laws.123 
Enacted in 1576, the statute provided for the punishment of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118  Mykitiuk, supra note 10 at 782. Bastards could acquire a surname, 
however, by nickname or reputation.  
119  Ibid. 
120  Blackstone, supra note 9 at 459.  
121  Nicholas Bala, “The Evolving Canadian Definition of the Family: 
Towards a Pluralistic and Functional Approach” (1994) 8 
International Journal of Law and the Family 293 at 301.  
122  Charlotte Whitton, “Children’s Rights and the Tax” (29 May 1943) 
Saturday Night at 20. 
123  An Act for Setting the Poor on Work, 1576, 18 Elizabeth, c 3. The 
impetus for the legislation had less to do with the care of illegitimate 
children than it did with the enclosure movement laying the 
ideological foundations for the “hegemony of private property and the 
market economy in the countryside”; Lance van Sittert, “Holding the 
Line: The Rural Enclosure Movement in the Cape Colony, c 1865-
1910” (2002) 43 Journal of African History 95 at 95. Indeed, as the 
process of sealing off common lands and converting them into private 
property advanced in England, it quickly became important for 
individual parents to bear responsibility for the maintenance and 
support of their children. 
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mother and the reputed father of an illegitimate child. 
Specifically, the law empowered the state to charge either 
parent with the support of a bastard child. While claims for 
support were rendered enforceable under the statute, the 
number of awards actually granted was limited by constraints 
on proof of paternity under subsequent affiliation laws, 
including the imposition of quasi-criminal legal standards such 
as requiring a mother’s paternity testimony to be 
corroborated.124 For instance, under the Poor Law Amendment 
Act of 1834, bastard children became the sole responsibility of 
their mothers; if a mother came to rely on a parish for support, 
however, the parish could sue a father for reimbursement only 
if a mother’s paternity claim was corroborated by a third party. 
The rationale behind this evidentiary requirement was to ensure 
that orders were not made on the basis of fabricated assertions 
to “trap wealthy men.”125 Indeed, the statute went so far as to 
state that, “no part of the monies paid by such putative fathers 
in pursuance of such order shall at any time be paid to the 
mother of such bastard child, nor in any way applied to the 
maintenance and support of such mother.”126 
 
The laws of England were essential in shaping the legal 
ideology of administrators in the colonies; they were still 
adapted and customized, however, to meet the perceived needs 
of local constituents. Upper Canada, for instance, did not 
receive or apply England’s Poor Laws. This decision does not 
reflect, however, a greater tolerance of children born out of 
wedlock in the colony, nor does it imply the existence of an 
alternative bastardy regime buttressed by other mechanisms of 
support. Indeed, lawmakers in Upper Canada shared “punitive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124  Wanda Wiegers, “Fatherhood and Misattributed Genetic Paternity in 
Family Law” (2011) 36 Queen’s LJ 623 at 631. 
125  Chambers, supra note 8 at 16.  
126  Martha Bailey, “Servant Girls and Masters: The Tort of Seduction 
and the Support of Bastards” (1991) 10 Can J Fam L 150 at 152. 
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attitudes towards illegitimacy that were reinforced by the 
dominant Christian religious orders.”127 Instead, bastard 
children were born into a legislative abyss characterized by [1] 
the conspicuous absence of a system of public relief, and [2] a 
process for establishing affiliation. In the New World, neither 
the mother nor the putative father could be held responsible for 
the support of an illegitimate child. Furthermore, without 
establishing poor laws, there was no incentive to build 
poorhouses or have the local community care for children born 
out of wedlock. Bastard children were often left to private 
orphanages that operated more like “baby farms [. . .] housed 
under appalling conditions [. . .] where they too often died.”128 
The situation of bastard children remained unchanged and 
largely unchallenged in Ontario until the twentieth century.129 
 
Illegitimacy Statutes in Ontario in the Twentieth Century 
 
In 1921, Ontario — and the rest of Canada — quickly 
recognized the importance of addressing the growing 
population of single mothers in the aftermath of the First World 
War. Indeed, while “[the] widows of men killed on the 
battlefield were [easily] . . . pitied and supported (if reluctantly) 
by the burgeoning state bureaucracy of the post-war period,” 
the plight of other single mothers could no longer justifiably be 
ignored.130 Consequently, rather than incentivize sexual 
relations outside of the traditional Canadian legal definition of 
the family, namely, “the relationship of a married man and 
woman and their biological . . . children,”131 Ontario legislated 
into law a reform package trilogy consisting of mechanisms by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127  Chambers, supra note 8 at 16. 
128  Ibid at 17.  
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid. 
131  Bala, supra note 121 at 293. 
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which single mothers of bastard children could legitimate their 
illegitimate children.132 Specifically, Ontario enacted the 
following three statutes: [1] An Act Respecting the Legitimation 
of Children by the Subsequent Intermarriage of their 
Parents;133 [2] An Act Respecting the Adoption of Children;134 
and [3] An Act for the Protection of the Children of Unmarried 
Parents Act [“CUPA”].135  
 
The three statutes were collectively designed to 
mitigate the consequences of illegitimacy for children in 
Ontario by providing different outlets of support for children 
excluded under the Ontario Mothers’ Allowance Act.136 More 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
132  Chambers, supra note 8 at 17. 
133  An Act Respecting the Legitimation of Children by the Subsequent 
Intermarriage of their Parents, SO 1921, c 53 [Legitimation Act]. 
The Legitimation Act was the first piece of legislation passed in the 
child welfare package; it allowed for the “subsequent legitimation of 
children, born outside of lawful wedlock, whose biological parents 
later married” (Chambers, supra note 8 at 27). It provided couples 
with an opportunity to ensure that their child would not be affixed 
with the bastard label. Furthermore, it guaranteed that a child would 
not be precluded from inheriting in the event of an intestate 
succession. 
134  An Act Respecting the Adoption of Children, SO 1921, c 55 [Adoption 
Act]. The Adoption Act represented a significant departure from the 
common law: for the first time in the province’s history, children 
could be adopted by either strangers or kin. Until 1921, adoption was 
only possible in Ontario through private members’ bills in the 
provincial legislature. The province based its legislation on that of 
Massachusetts — the first state in the United States to amend the 
common law and provide a means for “formalizing adoptions and 
giving familial status to the non-biological child” (Chambers, supra 
note 8 at 28). 
135  An Act for the Protection of the Children of Unmarried Parents Act, 
SO 1921, c 54 [CUPA].  
136  Mothers’ Allowance Act, SO 1921, c 79. 
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specifically, given that the Mothers’ Allowance Act was 
initially enacted solely for the purposes of supporting “fit and 
proper” widows, single mothers with bastard children were 
consciously overlooked.137 Indeed, while the moral regulation 
of Ontario’s single mothers is beyond the purview of this 
paper, readers should be cognizant of the fact that income 
security for single mothers was not initially based on need; 
rather, it was contingent on adherence to strict moral standards, 
namely, “the desire to maintain a hegemonic, Anglo-Saxon, 
middle-class model of family life and sexual restraint.”138 
 
Of the three laws passed in the 1921 reform package, 
the third statute, namely, CUPA, was the most degrading and 
punitive towards unwed mothers; it was designed as a last 
resort mechanism by which unwed mothers could obtain 
financial support from the putative fathers of their children. 
Specifically, the law undermined the common law assumption 
that a mother was the de facto guardian of her illegitimate 
child. Section 10 provided that a provincial officer “may upon 
his own application be appointed guardian of a child born out 
of wedlock either alone or jointly with the mother of such 
child.”139 Further, it was the state — and not the mother — who 
was authorized to sue the putative father for support. The state 
had provided unwed mothers with mechanisms for either 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137  Margaret Hillyard Little, “‘Manhunts and Bingo Blabs’: The Moral 
Regulation of Ontario Single Mothers” (1994) 19:2 The Canadian 
Journal of Sociology 233 at 236. This policy was expanded over time 
to include a variety of single mothers. According to the author, each 
category of single mother was placed on a hierarchy of worthiness: 
“Widows were considered [the] most deserving and received the least 
scrutiny. Women with incapacitated husbands were the second group 
to receive the allowance. . . . Deserted wives, on the other hand, were 
considerably less worthy according to [Ontario Mothers’ Allowance] 
administrators”.  
138  Chambers, supra note 8 at 24.  
139  CUPA, supra note 135 at s 10 (emphasis added]. 
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legitimating their bastard child or releasing it for adoption.140 
The CUPA, consequently, was a last attempt by the state to 
privatize the costs of reproduction. Put in another way, the law 
would prevent illegitimate children from “becoming a burden 
on society” if they were unsuccessfully placed in a normative 
family.141 
 
Although ostensibly about child welfare, CUPA did 
little to actually ameliorate the social and economic 
circumstances of illegitimate children. First, a father ordered to 
pay support under this statute did not acquire any meaningful 
status with regard to his child. Consequently, beyond 
maintenance, a child did not have any claims against his father. 
Second, the child remained filius nullius, without rights of 
inheritance or membership in the father’s family. Thus, in a 
“patriarchal world [where] carrying [a] father’s name had legal, 
symbolic, and social importance, [this law] did nothing to 
reduce the stigma to which the illegitimate child was 
subjected.”142 In short, in an effort to encourage formation of 
state-sanctioned traditional family forms, CUPA reinforced and 
perpetuated discriminatory stereotypes of illegitimate children 
and their mothers. Bastard children were destined to receive 
limited and precarious economic relief for no reason above and 




In 2012, there is a cross-Canada statutory abolition of the legal 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140  Legitimation Act, supra note 133; Adoption Act, supra note 134. 
141  Chambers, supra note 8 at 30. 
142  Ibid at 31.  
143  Lori Chambers, “Illegitimate Children and the Children of Unmarried 
Parents Act” in Edgar-André Montigny & Lori Chambers, eds, 
Ontario Since Confederation: A Reader (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000) at 250. 
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distinction between children born to married parents and 
children born to unmarried parents.144 Indeed, as the percentage 
of children born out of wedlock began to rise sharply 
throughout the country in the 1960s, the concept of illegitimacy 
began to lose its legal persuasiveness.145 By the end of the 
1990s, approximately one-third of Canadian children satisfied 
the common law definition of a bastard.146 Consequently, rather 
than relegate a third of the country’s children to illegitimate 
legal status, lawmakers were forced to consider how to specify 
in law that all children were to be afforded identical treatment, 
regardless of the marital status of their parents. Ontario, for 
instance, was the first province in Canada to formally abolish 
the legal distinction between children born inside and outside 
of marriage.147 Specifically, in 1978, the Children’s Law 
Reform Act [“CLRA”] was enacted. Section 1(4) states:  
 
[a]ny distinction at common law between the 
status of children born in wedlock and born out 
of wedlock is abolished and the relationship of 
parent and child and kindred relationships 
flowing therefrom shall be determined for the 
purposes of the common law in accordance with 
this section.148 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Colleen Sheppard, “Intimacy, Rights and the Parent-Child 
Relationship: Rethinking Freedom of Association in Canada” (2004) 
National Journal of Constitutional Law 104 at 147. 
145  Leckey, supra note 19 at 19. 
146  Heather Juby, Nicole Marcil-Gratton & Céline Le Bourdais, When 
Parents Separate: Further Findings From the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Children and Youth: Research Report (Canada: Department 
of Justice, 2004) at 6-7. 
147  Bala, supra note 121 at 301. 
148  CLRA, supra note 63 at s (4). Section 1(3) of the SLRA — the 
“Relationship of persons born outside marriage” provision — now 
reflects s 1(4) of the CLRA and states: “[i]n this Act, and in any will 
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The above provision reflects the severance of the 
relationship between a child’s legal status and his or her 
parents’ relationship. Today, filial bonds “connect children 
directly to parents, largely unmediated by . . . their parents’ 
marital status”.149 While historically it was justifiable to 
deprive children of fundamental legal rights, including the right 
to a surname, the right to maintenance and support, and the 
right to inherit, exclusively on the basis of the circumstances of 
their birth, Canadians now live in a new era of equality rights. 
Indeed, under the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms,150 it has been determined by the courts that birth 
status is an unenumerated and analogous ground of prohibited 
discrimination.151 Consequently, and in light of contemporary 
legislative enactments, it seems incongruent with the present 
status quo to suggest that a group of Canadian children can 
legally be subject to rights-related deprivations for reasons 
surrounding the manner in which they were conceived.  
 
The following section of this paper will demonstrate, 
however, that discriminatory treatment on the basis of birth 
status is not a relic of a bygone era. Indeed, absent legislative 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
unless a contrary intention is shown in the will, a reference to a 
person in terms of a relationship to another person determined by 
blood or marriage shall be deemed to include a person who comes 
within the description despite the fact that he or she or any other 
person through whom the relationship is traced was born outside 
marriage”: SLRA, supra note 25.  
149  Leckey, supra note 19 at 19. See also, for instance, s 522 of the CCQ: 
“All children whose filiation is established have the same rights and 
obligations, regardless of their circumstances of birth” (supra note 
95). 
150  Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 
11 at s 15. 
151  Bala, supra note 121 at 301. 
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reform, it follows that after-born children in Ontario will be 
dispossessed of intestate inheritance rights in a manner that 
raises similar issues to the province’s treatment of bastard 
children in the previous century.152 Specifically, the section 
will describe how posthumously conceived children await 
discrimination in light of the provisions of the SLRA. The 
section will begin by detailing how after-born children pose 
particular problems for the definitions contained in the SLRA; it 
will proceed by defending the assertion that Ontario must enact 
legislative reform in order to avoid creating a new and 
unofficial category of bastard in law.153 
 
SECTION III: 
THE NEW BASTARD: ASSESSING THE 
DEFINITIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
SUCCESSION LAW REFORM ACT FOR AFTER-BORN 
CHILDREN 
 
When parents die without leaving wills, the intestate succession 
laws of the relevant jurisdiction govern their children’s 
inheritance rights.154 One of the primary goals of intestacy law 
is to “effectuate the decedent’s likely intent in the distribution 
of his [or her] property.”155 Put in another way, intestacy 
statutes create default wills that approximate the distributive 
scheme a decedent would have chosen had he or she engaged 
in formal estate planning prior to death.156 In so doing, 
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153  Burns & Sumakova, supra note 26 at 67.  
154  Ibid.  
155  Susan N Gary, “Adapting Intestacy Laws to Changing Families” 
(2000) 18 Law & Inequality 1:4 at 7-8. 
156  Lee-ford Tritt, “Sperms and Estates: An Unadulterated Functionally 
Based Approach to Parent-Child Property Succession” (2009) 62 
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intestacy statutes presume that decedents want their property 
devolving to their families. In practical terms, the 
consequences of this legislative presumption include: [1] the 
exclusion of individuals whom the decedent might have 
considered a child and might have preferred as a recipient of 
his or her property; and [2] the inclusion of individuals with 
whom the decedent might not have had a relationship or was 
even ignorant to their existence.157  
 
Posthumously conceived children fall into the second 
of the above-enumerated categories. More specifically, given 
that after-born children are conceived following the death of 
one of their biological donor parents, it is, quite literally, 
impossible for that child to have had a relationship with the 
deceased. It is logical to assume that a decedent would intend 
for his or her estate to pass on to a child that he or she “actively 
raised and nurtured within his [or her] family.”158  It also makes 
sense that a decedent would be less likely to intend for his or 
her estate to pass onto a child that he or she did not even know 
“simply on account of a biological connection or legal 
presumption.”159  
 
What makes no sense, however, is for the law to 
statutorily bar a child from inheriting on the estate of its parent 
in intestacy simply on account of the way in which that child 
came into existence — circumstances over which that child had 
no control.  Indeed, the SCC has explicitly condemned judicial 
interpretations of statutes that discriminate against children on 
the basis of birth status. In Brule v Plummer,160 Laskin, C.J.C., 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
157  Ibid at 382.  
158  Megan Pendleton, “Intestate Inheritance Claims: Determining a 
Child’s Right to Inherit When Biological and Presumptive Paternity 
Overlap” (2008) 29:6 Cardozo L Rev 2823 at 2826-27. 
159  Ibid at 2827. 
160  [1979] 2 SCR 343, 94 DLR (3d) 481 at 360 [Brule]. 
Introducing the Next Class of Bastard 
	  
answered the following when considering whether a child born 
out of wedlock could be considered a preferred beneficiary 
within the meaning of section 164(2) of The Insurance Act 
(1960):161 
 
There are, I think, three questions that present 
themselves at this point. First, is there any 
reason, on principles of construction or from the 
standpoint of context, to narrow the ordinary 
meaning of “children” to exclude illegitimate 
children? Second, is there any clear course of 
decision that would impel this Court to such a 
result? Third, is there any reason of policy, 
either reflected in the enactment under 
discussion or from a more general standpoint, to 
limit the right of a father or a mother to 
designate a natural born child as his or her 
preferred beneficiary? I would answer all three 
questions in the negative.162 
 
Part II of the SLRA governs intestate succession in 
Ontario; “[i]n particular, it sets out the entitlement of spouses, 
children and remoter issue.”163 Because of their posthumously 
conceived status, it remains unclear whether or not after-born 
children can take on intestacy. This legislative ambiguity is 
largely a result of the definitions provided in the SLRA. 
Specifically, section 1.1 of the SLRA defines “child” as 
including “a child conceived before and born alive after the 
parent’s death,” and “issue” as including “a descendant 
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162  Brule, supra note 160 at 360. 
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conceived before and born alive after the person’s death.”164 In 
addition, sections 47(1) and 47(2) state the following:  
 
[W]here a person dies intestate in respect of 
property and leaves issue surviving him or her, 
the property shall be distributed, subject to the 
rights of the spouse, if any, equally among his or 
her issue who are of the nearest degree in which 
there are issue surviving him or her. 
 
[W]here any issue of the degree entitled under 
subsection (1) has predeceased the intestate, the 
share of such issue shall be distributed among 
his or her issue in the manner set out in 
subsection (1) and the share devolving upon any 
issue of that and subsequent degrees who 
predecease the intestate shall be similarly 
distributed.165 
 
In short, when an individual dies intestate, the only family 
members entitled to inherit from their estate are those who 
satisfy the SLRA’s prescribed definitions of “spouse”, “child”, 
and “issue.”166 
 
The definitions of “child” and “issue” in the SLRA pose 
a particular problem for after-born children; specifically, a 
literal reading of the definitions’ inclusion of the word 
“conception” would preclude after-born children from 
becoming heirs in the event of intestate succession. A child 
conceived before the death of its intestate parent and who is in 
the mother’s womb at the time of death satisfies the SLRA’s 
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definition of both “child” and “issue.”167 In contrast, a child 
who is not only born, but also conceived after the death of its 
intestate parent, is a prima facie challenge to section 1.1’s 
definition of both “child” and “issue.”168    
 
While it must be conceded that neither definition 
explicitly excludes such children from becoming heirs, the 
Canadian courts have not yet had an opportunity to consider 
whether an after-born child has been “conceived before death” 
within the meaning of the SLRA.169 Furthermore, there is little 
doubt that the drafters of the above provisions did not have the 
after-born in mind when considering the wording of the 
definitions. Indeed, the language is based on [1] a rule that has 
existed unchanged for over a thousand years, namely, that all 
heirs must be living or in gestation at the time of a decedent’s 
death, and [2] a reproductive reality that preceded the 
discovery of cryopreservation and the possibility of having 
viable frozen sperm.170 Put in another way, “posthumous 
conception was literally science fiction both when the 
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[traditional] rule was established” and when the drafters 
codified it in the SLRA.171 The most obvious and seemingly 
effective way of resolving the question as to whether or not 
after-born children are to be included in the SLRA’s definition 
of both “child” and “issue” is legislative reform; this is unlikely 
to occur, however, “in the near future given the corollary 
policy debates that are likely to arise in the context of any 
legislative discussion of the concept of conception.”172  
 
Ontario’s silence on the treatment of after-born 
children on intestacy is not an isolated legislative gap in the 
country. Indeed, to date, the intestacy regimes of most 
Canadian provinces, including Québec,173 Alberta,174 
Manitoba,175 New Brunswick,176 Newfoundland and 
Labrador,177 Nova Scotia,178 Prince Edward Island,179 and 
Saskatchewan,180 have similarly failed to address the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
171  Burns & Sumakova, supra note 26 at 363. 
172  Ibid. In order to avoid uncertainty, the authors encourage parents to 
protect their after-born children by executing wills. Indeed, 
testamentary dispositions leaving property explicitly to a 
predetermined after-born child do not pose the same legal issues. For 
instance, if a man dies with a validly executed will and leaves his 
estate to his children, the question becomes whether or not a 
posthumously conceived child should be included in the will’s 
definition of “children”. 
173  CCQ, supra note 95 at s 617. 
174  Wills and Succession Act, SA 2010, c W-12.2 at s 58(2). 
175  The Intestate Succession Act, CCSM c 185 at s 1(3). 
176  Devolution of Estates Act, RSNB 1973, c D-9 at s 30. 
177  Intestate Succession Act, RSNL 1990, c I-21 at s 12. 
178  Intestate Succession Act, RSNS 1989, c 236 at s 12. 
179  Probate Act, RSPEI 1988, c P-21 at s 95. 
180  The Intestate Succession Act, 1996, SS 1996, c I-13.1 at s 14. 
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challenges posed by children conceived posthumously.181 
British Columbia, by contrast, recently amended the Wills, 
Estates and Succession Act to give after-born children 
inheritance rights from a deceased biological donor parent on 
intestacy. Though the British Columbia statute is not yet in 
force, the following amendment is envisioned:   
 
467. A descendant of a deceased person, 
conceived and born after the person’s death, 
inherits as if the descendant had been born in the 
lifetime of the deceased person and had survived 
the deceased person if all of the following 
conditions apply: 
(a) a person who was married to, or in a 
marriage-like relationship with, the deceased 
person when that person died gives written 
notice, within 180 days from the issue of a 
representation grant, to the deceased person’s 
personal representative, beneficiaries and 
intestate successors that the person may use the 
human reproductive material of the deceased 
person to conceive a child through assisted 
reproduction; 
(b) the descendant is born within 2 years after 
the deceased person’s death and lives for at least 
5 days; 
(c) the deceased person is the descendant’s 
parent under Part 3 of the Family Law Act.182 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181  ALRI, supra note 23 at 17. 
182  See Bill 4, Wills, Estates and Succession Act, 1st Sess, 39th Parl, 
British Columbia, 2009, online: British Columbia Legislative 
Assembly <http://www.leg.bc.ca/39th1st/3rd_read/gov04-3.htm> 
[Bill 4]. 
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The above provision was one of many outlined in a 
172-paged white paper detailing how the province intended on 
revamping its outdated, and three-decade-old, Family Relations 
Act.183 Family law practitioners across the country commended 
British Columbia for its cutting-edge —albeit controversial — 
solutions to unforeseen contemporary family law issues. 
Indeed, Toronto family law expert and editor of the Reports of 
Family Law, Philip Epstein, said many other provinces, 
including Ontario, could learn from British Columbia's 
efforts.184    
 
British Columbia is not the only jurisdiction to have 
considered the inheritance rights of children conceived 
posthumously. Other jurisdictions, including the United States, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia, have begun to do so both 
in court and in their respective legislatures. Consequently, the 
following section of this paper will evaluate the diverging 
outcomes in law of the above-named jurisdictions with respect 
to the intestate succession rights of posthumously conceived 
children; it will do so by considering cases which address 
posthumous conception issues, and the few legislatures which 
have enacted statutes that specifically deal with the inheritance 
rights of posthumously conceived children. The section will 
conclude with a discussion of the various interests at stake 
should Ontario choose to reform the SLRA. Specifically, the 
section will consider the following elements: [1] delay of 
distribution; [2] notice to interested parties; [3] the marital 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  RSBC 1996, c 128. 
184  Cristin Schmitz, “BC Poised For Massive Family Law Overhaul” 30 
:17 The Lawyer’s Weekly (10 September 2010). 
185  MLRC, supra note 28 at 17.  
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SECTION IV: 
LIFE AFTER DEATH: A CALL FOR ADVANCEMENT 
IN LEGISLATION FOR AFTER-BORN CHILDREN 
 
The issues raised by posthumously conceived children in the 
context of intestate succession are no longer just theoretical.186 
Indeed, a number of courts outside of Canada have begun 
applying existing statutes to novel questions never before 
anticipated by their original drafters. The judicial outcomes to 
date have been inconsistent but for one common holding, 
namely, an appeal to the legislature of their respective 
jurisdiction to address the questions posed by after-born 
children in a comprehensive and thoughtful way. Only a few 
legislatures, however, have answered this call to action.187  
 
Outside of British Columbia,188 lawmakers in the 
United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are leading the 
way in devising legislative answers to the questions raised by 
the after-born. Most jurisdictions, however, have chosen to 
either ignore or exclude after-born children for the purposes of 
intestate inheritance.189 For instance, in the United States, 
thirty-three states have not addressed whether or not an after-
born child can take on his or her deceased biological donor 
parent’s intestacy.190 Seventeen states, by contrast, have 
directly addressed this issue and are more or less evenly split 
on the outcome. Specifically, eight states have granted intestate 
inheritance rights to after-born children and nine states have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
186  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 350. 
187  Ibid. 
188  Bill 4, supra note 182. 
189  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 350. 
190 Ibid at 401. The author provides a detailed table outlining the 
approaches to after-born children for probate purposes by jurisdiction 
in the United States. 
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denied such rights to posthumously conceived children. Of the 
states that have granted status to after-born children, six have 
done so via their legislatures,191 and two have done so through 
their courts.192 Of the nine states that have denied inheritance 
rights to posthumously conceived children, seven have done so 
by statute,193 and two have done so in court.194 Interestingly, 
“of the four court cases that have established the law in their 
respective jurisdictions, the courts split while construing 
essentially identical provisions.”195 In short, there is no 
consensus regarding the best approach or the most appropriate 
goals for a statutory solution to the challenges raised by the 
after-born; this confusing legislative landscape has forced 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191  Namely, California (Cal Prob Code at §§249.5-249.8 [Cal Prob 
Code]); Colorado (Colo Rev Stat Ann at §15-11-120 [Colo Rev Stat 
Ann]); Florida (Fla Stat Ann at §742.17(4) [Fla Stat Ann]); Iowa 
(Iowa Code Ann at §633.220) [Iowa Code Ann]); Louisiana (La Rev 
Stat Ann at §9:391.1(A) [La Rev Stat Ann]); and North Dakota (ND 
Cent Code Ann at §30.1-04-19 [ND Cent Code Ann]). 
192  Namely, Massachusetts (Woodward v Comm'r of Soc Sec, 760 NE 
(2d) 257 (Mass 2002) [Woodward]); and New Jersey (In re Estate of 
Kolacy, 753 A (2d) 1257 (NJ Sup Ct Ch Div 2000) [In re Estate of 
Kolacy]). 
193  Namely, Georgia (Ga Code Ann at §53-2-1(b)(1) [Ga Code Ann); 
Idaho (Idaho Code Ann at §15-2-108 [Idaho Code Ann]); Minnesota 
(Minn Stat Ann at §524.2-120(10) [Minn Stat Ann]); South Carolina 
(SC Code Ann at §62-2-108 [SC Code Ann]; South Dakota (SD 
Codified Laws at §29A-2-108 [SD Codified Laws]); New York (NY 
Est. Powers & Trusts Law at §5-3.2(a)-(b)); and Virginia (Va Code 
Ann at §20-164 [Va Code Ann]). A court has recognized, however, 
after-born children for class-gift purposes in New York in In re 
Martin B., 841 NYS (2d) 207, 212 (Sur Ct 2007). 
194  Namely, Arkansas (Finley v Astrue, 270 SW (3d) 849 (Ark 2008) 
[Finley]); and New Hampshire (Khabbaz ex rel Eng v Comm'r, Soc 
Sec Admin., 930 A (2d) 1180 at 1182 (NH 2007) [Khabbaz]). 
195  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 402. 
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courts to settle cases surrounding these children with little 
guidance.196  
 
The Judicial Approach: Case Law Disentitling After-Born 
Children from Inheriting 
 
The following US cases, namely, Finley v. Astrue [“Finley”],197 
Khabbaz ex rel. Eng v. Comm'r, Soc Sec Admin 
[“Khabbaz”],198 and Stephen v. Commissioner [“Stephen”],199 
describe three situations whereby after-born children were 
prevented from receiving survivor benefits under the Social 
Security Act [“SSA”] in consequence of the intestacy laws of 
the relevant state jurisdiction.200 By way of legal background, it 
should be noted that, in the social security context, the “[US] 
Code provides for the application of the intestate distribution 
laws of the state in which the decedent is domiciled at the time 
of his or her death.”201 Consequently, if the state where a 
decedent was domiciled at the time of his or her death excludes 
biological children from the class of intestate beneficiaries, a 
decedent’s biological children will be prohibited from 
receiving social security survivor benefits.202 The SSA provides 
important economic support for families after a parental 
death.203 For instance, if a child were dependent on a worker 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  Suppon, supra note 15 at 229.  
197  Finley, supra note 194. 
198  Khabbaz, supra note 194. 
199  Stephen v Commissioner, 386 F Supp (2d) 1257 (MD Fla, 2005) 
[Stephen]. 
200  Social Security Act, 42 USC at §416(h)(2)(A) (West 2004) [SSA]. 
This provision mirrors s 1.1 of the SLRA, supra note 25. 
201  Harper, supra note 33 at 274. 
202  Ibid at 275. 
203  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 384. 
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who was fully insured under the SSA at the time of his or her 
death, the child would be eligible to receive monthly 
benefits.204 Furthermore, if a worker’s spouse is responsible for 
providing primary care to an eligible child, he or she can also 
receive monthly benefits until the child reaches the age of 
sixteen or is no longer disabled.205 In 2010, the average 
monthly award to an eligible child was $750.206 Thus, “for an 
“average” family with one child, the annual survivor benefits to 
the child and surviving spouse would total $18,840.”207 
 
Finley v. Astrue 
 
In Finley, the Supreme Court of Arkansas was asked to 
determine whether or not a child, created as an embryo through 
IVF during his parent’s marriage, but implanted into his 
mother’s womb after the death of his biological donor father, 
could inherit from the decedent under Arkansas intestacy law 
as a surviving child.208 In order to inherit on an intestacy in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
204  A child who is dependent on the worker at the time of his or her death 
can receive monthly benefits if the child is not married and [1] is 
under eighteen years of age, [2] is under nineteen years of age and in 
high school, or [3] is under a disability the child attained before the 
age of twenty-two, SSA, supra note 200 at §202(d)(1)(B). 
205  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 384. “The amount payable to a survivor 
equals 75% of the decedent’s primary insurance amount, which is the 
monthly benefit amount that would have been payable to the worker 
upon initial entitlement at full retirement age.” A family’s maximum 
provision, however, limits the total benefits to a family to between 
150% and 188% of the worker’s primary insurance amount.  
206  Ibid. 
207  Ibid at 384-5. The aggregate amount over eighteen years would total 
$306, 000. 
208  Finley, supra note 194 at 850. The petitioner impregnated herself 
with an embryo following the death of her husband. The embryo 
resulted from the egg and sperm deposits that were made by the 
petitioner and her husband during their marriage together.  
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Arkansas, a child must at least have been “born after, but 
conceived before the decedent’s death.”209 The petitioner in 
this case, (unsuccessfully) argued that, because her child 
resulted from an embryo created prior to her husband’s death, 
the child satisfied the requirements of the SSA, namely, being 
conceived before a decedent’s death.210 The petitioner posited 
that if the court accepted her argument, her child would be 
deemed to “inherit in the same manner as if born in the lifetime 
of the intestate,” and thus would be eligible for social security 
benefits.211 The court, however, concluded that the petitioner 
“did not conceive her child during her husband’s life as 
required for the child to take as the husband’s intestate 
distributee.”212 In addition, while acknowledging that the SSA 
did not provide a definition of “conceive”, the court refused to 
usurp the Arkansas legislature’s role of defining when 
conception occurs:  
 
[While IVF] and other methods of assisted 
reproduction are new technologies that created 
new legal issues not addressed by already-
existing law, . . . [defining the term “conceive”] 
would be making a determination that would 
implicate many public policy concerns, 
including, but certainly not limited to, the 
finality of estates.213 
 
The holding in Finley does not account for children 
conceived posthumously. More specifically, given that the 
court did not find embryo creation equivalent to conception, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209  Ibid at 853. 
210  Ibid. 
211  Ibid at 851. 
212  Harper, supra note 33 at 278. 
213  Finley, supra note 194 at 854-55. 
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the law applied in Finley is only relevant for posthumous 
children conceived during the lifetime of their biological donor 
father. What Finley does represent for the after-born child, 
however, is the problematic nature of applying outdated laws to 
novel legal issues.214 Indeed, despite [1] the surviving parent 
reproducing a child within a year of her husband’s death, and 
[2] having a strong indication of the father’s intent to conceive 
— he did, after all, participate in the couple’s conception plan 
through the creation of an embryo — the court refused to take 
the place of the legislature. In fact, the court urged the General 
Assembly to consider issues such as consent and time 
limitations, among other things, in the context of intestate 
succession for after-born children: “intestacy succession 
statutes [need to be revisited] to address issues involved in the 
instant case and those that have not but will likely evolve.”215 
In other words, legislation needs to be created in this area “so 
[that] individuals in similar situations can predict the likely 
outcome of their actions and not be left in a Finley situation, 
where the law does not even encompass the manner in which 
this [after-born] child came into the world.”216 
 
Khabbaz ex rel Eng v. Comm'r, Soc Sec Admin 
 
Similar to Finley, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire held 
in Khabbaz that a child conceived via artificial insemination 
after her biological donor father, Rumzi Khabbaz, died was not 
eligible to inherit from the decedent as his surviving issue 
under New Hampshire intestacy law. Consequently, Donna 
Eng, the surviving parent, was unable to get social security 
survivor benefits for Christine, her posthumously conceived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214  Pytel, supra note 14 at 80. 
215  Finley, supra note 194 at 855. 
216  Pytel, supra note 14 at 80-81. 
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child.217 Eng put forward an array of arguments that were 
ultimately rejected by the court for being “inconsistent with 
[its] practice of construing statutes that deal with a similar 
subject matter [in such a way] that they do not contradict each 
other.”218            
 
First, Eng argued that Christine should be classified as 
a “surviving issue” based on the language of the state’s 
intestacy statute. The court, however, relying on its 
interpretation of the word “surviving”, reasoned that, because 
Christine was conceived after her biological donor father’s 
death, she could not legally be recognized as his surviving heir. 
In fact, the court went so far as to state that, “[no after-born 
child] is a ‘surviving issue’ within the plain meaning of the 
[New Hampshire] statute.”219 Interestingly, Eng argued that, in 
the alternative, Christine was a non-marital child because she 
was not married to her husband at the time the child was 
conceived. Eng wanted Christine to be treated as a child born 
out of wedlock so that she could “avail herself of the process 
the legislature had established for non-marital children to have 
the opportunity to inherit from their fathers.”220 The court 
rejected this argument for two reasons: [1] the legislature 
enacted the statute to protect children whose parents were not 
married prior to their births — Eng and her husband, 
consequently, were not among the class of persons intended to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
217  Khabbaz, supra note 194. After Khabbaz was diagnosed with a 
terminal illness, he began banking his sperm for his wife. Khabbaz 
executed a consent form authorizing Eng to use the sperm to conceive 
his child. Khabbaz also indicated he wanted to be acknowledged as 
the legal father if Eng conceived a child through artificial 
insemination using his sperm. The couple already had one biological 
child. Khabbaz died in 1998 and Christine was born in 2000. 
218  Ibid at 1186. 
219  Ibid at 1184. 
220  Lewis, supra note 16 at 421. 
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be protected by the statute;221 and [2] Christine could not be 
categorized as an illegitimate child because the state’s statutory 
scheme considered children conceived via artificial 
insemination by a married woman to be legitimate.222 Eng’s 
final argument was based on public policy; it was similarly 
rejected by the court:  
 
[W]e agree with the special concurrence that 
“the intestacy statute . . . essentially leaves an 
entire class of posthumous[ly  conceived] 
children unprotected.” However, the present 
statute requires that result. To reach the opposite 
result . . . would require us to add words to a 
statute. . . . We reserve such matters of public 
policy for the legislature.223 
 
For the purposes of this paper, the above passage from 
Khabbaz is especially revealing. Indeed, the court openly 
admits that the legislative situation in New Hampshire leaves 
an entire class of children unprotected in situations of intestacy. 
The implications of this statement become even clearer when 
one considers the fact that Khabbaz’s other biological child, 
born prior to the birth of Christine, was eligible to inherit from 
Khabbaz as his surviving issue under New Hampshire’s 
intestacy statute. In other words, despite both children being 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221  Khabbaz, supra note 194 at 1185 citing NH Rev Stat Ann at 
§561:4(II). “A child born of unwed parents shall inherit from or 
through his father as if born in lawful wedlock, under any of the 
following conditions: (a) Intermarriage of the parents after the birth 
of the child. (b) Acknowledgment of paternity or legitimation by the 
father. (c) A court decree adjudges the decedent to be the father 
before his death. (d) Paternity is established after the death of the 
father by clear and convincing evidence. (e) The decedent had 
adopted the child”.  
222  Ibid.  
223  Ibid at 1186. 
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conceived with Khabbaz’s sperm, the court differentiated — 
and thus, discriminated — between two biological children on 
the basis of the timing of their conception. In essence, “the 
court penalized Christine because of the circumstances of her 
birth. The Supreme Court [in both Canada and the United 
States] has renounced that approach with regard to non-marital 
children.”224  
 
Stephen v. Commissioner 
 
In Stephen — as in both Finley and Khabbaz — a child was 
denied social security benefits on the basis of his posthumously 
conceived status. This case arose in Florida when the Social 
Security Administration denied a surviving parent’s application 
for social security benefits on behalf of her son.225 The SSA 
requires the Commissioner to determine whether or not a child 
is entitled to receive child’s survivor benefits; guidance is 
provided by regulations which further instruct how to 
determine a child’s status.226 For instance, one regulation states 
that, “[a] child is eligible for benefits as the insured’s “natural 
child” if he could inherit the insured’s personal property as his 
natural child under state inheritance laws.”227 Under Florida’s 
intestacy laws, however, “a child conceived from the sperm of 
a person who died before the transfer of sperm to a woman’s 
body is not eligible for a claim against the decedent’s estate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224  Lewis, supra note 16 at 423. See Trimble v Gordon, 430 US 762 
(1977); and Brule, supra note 160. 
225  Stephen, supra note 199. Michelle and Gar Stephen were married for 
one month before Gar died of a heart attack. Michelle extracted her 
husband’s sperm the day after his death and cryopreserved it. Robert 
was born three and a half years later using the preserved sperm of his 
deceased biological donor father. 
226  Ibid at 1262 (citing SSA, supra note 200 at §402(d)).  
227  Ibid at 1263 (citing Code of Federal Regulations at §404.355(a)(1) 
(2009)). 
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unless the child has been provided for by the decedent’s 
will.”228 In Stephen, there was no will; irrespective of this fact, 
the court ultimately concluded that Robert, the after-born child 
in this case, could not receive social security benefits because 
he was not a dependent of the decedent at the time of his death. 
The court, in other words, ruled that Robert was not a surviving 
heir because he did not meet all of the requirements of the SSA, 
namely, being a dependent of the deceased at the time of his 
death.229 
 
Unlike Arkansas and New Hampshire, Florida law 
specifically addresses and excludes posthumously conceived 
children from inheriting in the event of intestacy. Explicit 
legislative guidance regarding the rights of after-born children, 
however, does not necessarily result in fair or just outcomes. 
Indeed, Florida’s “hard-lined approach [resulted in a] poor 
decision for posthumously conceived children [in Stephen].”230 
In Stephen, it was not until after the death of her husband that 
the wife chose to cryopreserve his sperm. Consequently, it 
would have been virtually impossible for the petitioner in this 
case to satisfy the requirements of Florida intestacy law, 
namely, for a deceased sperm donor to provide for a 
posthumously conceived child in his will. In other words, the 
law in Florida requires deceased biological donor fathers to 
have both expressly intended for and consented to a 
posthumous conception.231  
 
The facts in Stephen, as a result, may not have “len[t] 
themselves for the court to have decided otherwise,” given that 
the deceased biological father’s sperm was extracted after his 
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229  Ibid at 1265. 
230  Pytel, supra note 14 at 85. 
231  Lewis, supra note 16 at 403. 
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death and he provided no indication of intent.232 Florida’s 
current law is thus problematic; despite a father clearly 
indicating both his intent and consent, there will likely be 
scenarios where an after-born child is not expressly provided 
for in a will. In short, while Florida’s bright-line rule of strictly 
cutting off after-born children not provided for in a will may 
make for easy determinations, it risks producing unjust 
decisions that fail to reflect either the needs of an after-born 
child or the desires of a decedent — hallmark functions of 
intestacy statutes.233  
 
The Judicial Approach: Case Law Entitling After-Born 
Children to Inherit 
 
The courts in Finley, Khabbaz, and Stephen denied 
posthumously conceived children inheritance rights on the 
basis of their birth status; these cases are examples of the most 
restrictive approach to the inheritance challenges posed by 
these children.234 Indeed, an approach that automatically denies 
after-born children rights is “particularly harsh and does not 
promote the best interests of the child.”235 As a result, the next 
subsection will examine two other US cases, namely, 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security 
[“Woodward”],236 and Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart [“Gillett-
Netting”],237 where after-born children were granted inheritance 
rights under the intestacy statutes of the respective states in 
question. All of these cases focused heavily on the 
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237  Gillett-Netting v Barnhart, 371 F (3d) 593 (9th Cir 2004) [Gillett-
Netting]. 
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“overwhelming state interest of protecting children in their 
analy[ses].”238  
 
Woodward v. Commissioner of Social Security 
 
Woodward is considered to be one of the most notable 
decisions to date regarding the rights of posthumously 
conceived children.239 The Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
was asked to answer the following question:  
 
If a married man and woman arrange for sperm 
to be withdrawn from the husband for the 
purpose of artificially impregnating the wife, 
and the woman is impregnated with that sperm 
after the man, her husband, has died, will 
children resulting from such pregnancy enjoy 
the inheritance rights of natural children under 
Massachusetts’ law of intestate succession?240 
 
The court answered a qualified “yes” to the above question. 
More specifically, the court argued that, in “certain limited 
circumstances, a child resulting from posthumous reproduction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238  Suppon, supra note 15 at 235. 
239  Ibid at 232.  
240  Woodward, supra note 192 at 259. In Woodward, Lauren and Warren 
Woodward learned three years into their marriage that Warren had 
leukemia. The couple had no children at the time and subsequently 
learnt that Warren’s treatment might leave him sterile. Consequently, 
the couple decided to bank a quantity of Warren’s sperm. After 
undergoing an unsuccessful bone marrow transplant, Warren died in 
1993. Two years later, Lauren gave birth to twin girls conceived via 
artificial insemination using Warren’s preserved sperm. Lauren then 
filed for social security benefits on behalf of her twin girls. Her 
application was first rejected by the Social Security Administration 
“on the ground that she had not established that the twins were the 
husband’s “children” within the meaning of the Act”. 
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may enjoy the inheritance rights of “issue” under the 
Massachusetts intestacy statute.”241 These limited 
circumstances exist when the following elements of a four-
prong test are satisfied: [1] a genetic relationship between the 
child and the decedent is established; [2] the decedent 
consented to posthumous conception; [3] the decedent 
consented to supporting any resulting child; and [4] the child’s 
birth was within a “reasonable time” after the death of his or 
her biological donor parent.242 The court relied on three 
powerful interests in laying out these prongs, namely, the best 
interests of the child, the orderly administration of estates, and 
the reproductive rights of the biological donor parent.243  
 
After taking into consideration the above interests, the 
Woodward court granted a set of posthumously conceived 
twins inheritance rights. The court began their analysis with the 
following statement: “[i]n this developing and relatively 
unchartered area of human relations, bright-line rules are not 
favored unless the applicable statute requires them.”244 Unlike 
the Florida statute under evaluation in Stephen, the court in 
Woodward determined that the Massachusetts intestacy statute 
did not require a bright-line rule and “[did not] contain an 
express, affirmative requirement that posthumous children 
must “be in existence” as of the date of the decedent’s 
death.”245 Consequently, the court in this case was able to 
fashion an interpretation of existing legislation in such a way 
that produced a beneficial outcome for after-born children. 
Indeed, in the absence of an express legislative directive, the 
court concluded that automatically barring posthumously 
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conceived children from taking under their deceased biological 
donor parent’s estate would be unjust: 
 
Posthumously conceived children may not come 
into the world the way the majority of children 
do. But they are children nonetheless. We may 
assume that the Legislature intended that such 
children be “entitled,” in so far as possible, “to 
the same rights and protections of the law” as 
children conceived before death.246 
 
Gillett-Netting v. Barnhart 
 
Like the plaintiff in Woodward, the plaintiff in Gillett-Netting, 
Rhonda Gillett-Netting, impregnated herself with the 
cryopreserved sperm of her deceased husband, gave birth to 
twin daughters, and sought social security survivor benefits on 
behalf of her twins.247 The twins were denied social security 
benefits by the Social Security Administration on the ground 
that they were not actually dependent upon the insured 
decedent: 
 
The administrative law judge held that “the last 
possible time to determine dependents [sic] on 
the wage earner’s account is the date of the 
death of the wage earner.” Therefore, children 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
246  Ibid at 266 (emphasis added). 
247  Gillett-Netting, supra note 237 at 594-95. When Robert Netting was 
diagnosed with cancer, he and his wife, Rhonda, were trying to have a 
baby. After Robert’s doctors informed him that his chemotherapy 
might render him sterile, he banked his sperm to allow him and his 
wife to continue trying to conceive should he become sterile. Robert 
confirmed that he wanted Rhonda to have their children using his 
frozen sperm if he ended up dying from his cancer. Robert died in 
1994. After Robert’s death, Rhonda underwent IVF using her eggs 
and Robert’s sperm. The twins were born in 1996.  
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conceived after the wage earner’s death cannot 
be deemed dependent on the wage earner.248 
 
Gillett-Netting appealed the district court’s decision to the 
Ninth Circuit of the US Court of Appeals and argued that it 
was a violation of equal protection of the laws to apply the SSA 
to deny her children benefits. On appeal, the court held that 
Gillett-Netting’s posthumously conceived children were 
entitled to social security benefits because they were 
considered “legitimate children” under Arizona state law.249 
 
The Ninth Circuit of the US Court of Appeals began 
their analysis by noting that, “developing reproductive 
technology has outpaced federal and state laws, which 
currently do not address directly the legal issues created by 
[after-born] children.”250 The court looked no further than the 
law on child legitimacy in Arizona to adjudge that the 
posthumously conceived children in this case were the 
decedent’s legitimate children and were thus entitled to 
benefits. More specifically, the court concluded that the SSA 
only required an applicant to prove a child’s dependency to 
receive benefits if the child’s parentage was disputed. Under 
the law of Arizona, however, “[e]very child is the legitimate 
child of its natural parents and is entitled to support and 
education as if born in lawful wedlock.”251 Consequently, 
because the statute made parentage undisputed, the court held 
that the posthumously conceived children were “deemed 
dependent under the [SSA] and need not demonstrate actual 
dependency nor deemed dependency” to receive benefits.252 In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
248  Ibid at 595. 
249  Ibid at 599. 
250  Ibid at 595. 
251  Arizona Revised Statutes Ann at §8-601 (2007). 
252  Gillett-Netting, supra note 237 at 599. 
210 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 27, 2011] 
	  
other words, similar to the court in Woodward, the court in 
Gillett-Netting found a way to interpret existing legislation in a 




The inconsistent and divergent outcomes of on-point case law 
dealing with the rights of posthumously conceived children are 
a reflection of the current legislative landscape of intestate 
succession law. More specifically, because most state 
legislatures have not enacted statutes that explicitly deal with 
the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived children, the 
courts have been left to resolve the issue on a case-by-case, ad 
hoc basis.254 What stands at the center of this legislative void, 
however, are children. Posthumously conceived children have 
no control over the way in which they come into this world.255 
Consequently, it is every state legislature’s responsibility to 
protect these children by devising comprehensive legislation 
that weighs the competing interests at stake.256 
 
A legislative solution is the only way to definitively 
avoid the inconsistencies that have emerged in court and 
“provide parameters for which future individuals in this 
situation can follow to achieve important rights and benefits for 
their posthumously conceived children.”257 Indeed, even cases 
such as Woodward, which undoubtedly provide beneficial 
results for after-born children, are too restrictive and fail to 
consider the panoply of ways in which these children come into 
existence. For instance, the requirement in the Woodward four-
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pronged test that a deceased biological donor parent consent 
“not only to posthumous conception specifically, but also to 
support any resulting child,” is too limiting and would 
automatically preclude a posthumously conceived child 
resulting from the unexpected death of a parent.258 
Furthermore, states such as Florida, which have expressly dealt 
with some aspects of posthumous conception with the 
provision of straightforward, statutory bright-line rules, 
essentially preclude courts from undertaking analyses which 
consider the rights of both posthumously conceived children 
and their deceased biological donor parents.259 Consequently, 
the following subsection will detail considerations to take into 
account when promulgating legislation that adequately 
addresses the issues arising from the after-born; it will do so, 
first, by examining statutes enacted in the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and the United States — jurisdictions, in other 
words, with laws currently in force that govern the rights of 
posthumously conceived children — and second, after 
considering the experience and recommendations of other 
jurisdictions, will reconcile the competing interests to be 
weighed should Ontario choose to amend the SLRA.260   
 
The Legislative Approach: An Analysis of Existing Statutes 
Relating to After-Born Children 
 
In its report, Human Artificial Reproduction and Related 
Matters [“Report”], the Ontario Law Reform Commission 
[“OLRC”] recommended giving inheritance rights to 
posthumously conceived children so as not to discriminate 
against them. Specifically, the OLRC recommended amending 
the SLRA to include the following provision:  
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21(2) A child conceived posthumously with the 
sperm of the mother’s husband or partner should 
be entitled to inheritance rights in respect of any 
undistributed estate once the child is born or is 
en ventra sa mère, as if the child were conceived 
while the husband or partner was alive.261 
 
Published in 1985, the Report’s recommendation was never 
acted upon or implemented. The application of this provision 
was ultimately deemed “impracticable, or unacceptably 
disruptive where the estate has already been distributed 
according to . . . the law of intestate succession.”262 
Furthermore, it was believed that “[d]istributions made should 
not be . . . postponed simply because [sperm] is held in 
cryopreservation.”263 The above provision is one of the only 
documented attempts by Ontario lawmakers to regulate the 
rights of posthumously conceived children. Put in another way, 
for twenty-seven years, the rights of the after-born have 
remained up in the air.264  
 
Leaving the SLRA untouched would be unwise. Indeed, 
“sooner or later the issue[s] raised [by after-born children will] 
arise, and when [they do], the matter [will] have to be decided 
by a court action in an adversarial forum.”265 If the cost of a 
lawsuit does not deter a mother or father from bringing an 
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action on behalf of their posthumously conceived child, the 
following barrier likely will: there is no certainty of outcome in 
the interpretation of the SLRA as it now reads. Indeed, if on-
point US jurisprudence has demonstrated anything, it is that 
similarly worded legislation can result in a variety of — and 
often contradicting — interpretations.266 Furthermore, if a 
claim were successful, the court would still have to qualify its 
decision by attaching to the ruling conditional criteria to be 
satisfied. A court might also reject a claim by declaring itself to 
be an inappropriate forum to decide matters with such obvious 
public policy ramifications.267 In short, doing nothing is not a 
reasonable or responsible legislative response to the challenges 
posed by after-born children.268  
 
Explicit Legislative Exclusion of After-Born Children 
 
One possible legislative response to the challenges posed by 
after-born children is to expressly deny them inheritance rights. 
Indeed, this legal approach is endorsed by several states in the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and in New South Wales, 
Australia. For instance, posthumously conceived children are 
explicitly prohibited from taking on their biological donor 
father’s intestacy in the United Kingdom. In 2003, the British 
legislature passed into law the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology (Deceased Fathers) Act [“Deceased Fathers 
Act”].269 The Deceased Fathers Act was specifically enacted to 
“make provisions about the circumstances in which, and the 
extent to which, a man is to be treated in law as the father of a 
child where the child has resulted from certain fertility 
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treatments undertaken after the man’s death.”270 The 2003 law 
also amended section 28(6) of the Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Act 1990 [“HFEA”].271 Subsection 28(6) of HFEA 
stated: 
 
Where . . . the sperm of a man, or any embryo 
the creation of which was brought about with his 
sperm, was used after his death, he is not to be 
treated as the father of the child.272  
 
Under the Deceased Fathers Act, a deceased man is 
allowed to be treated as the father of a child, where, prior to his 
death, he consented to the use of his sperm or an embryo 
conceived with the use of his sperm.273 However, while the law 
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provides for a man to be registered as the father of a child 
conceived after his death, it confines this legal treatment to 
very limited purposes. More specifically, section 29(3B) 
provides that a deceased biological father “is to be treated in 
law as not being the father of the child for any other 
purpose.”274 In other words, if a posthumously conceived child 
is registered as the child of a deceased man, he or she “acquires 
no rights as regards that man or his estate in relation to 
succession, aliment, or legal rights.”275 Consequently, while 
this law provides a degree of certainty — there is a blanket 
prohibition against after-born children taking on an intestacy 
— it arguably fails to consider the best interests and wishes of 
both the deceased and his posthumously conceived child.276 
 
The jurisdiction of New South Wales, Australia, 
additionally precludes posthumously conceived children from 
taking on an intestacy. In 2007, the New South Wales Law 
Reform Commission [“NSW Commission”] recommended 
excluding after-born children from intestate succession rights. 
In their report, Uniform Succession Laws: Intestacy, the NSW 
Commission recommended that, “[t]he model laws should 
make it clear that persons born after the death of the intestate 
must have been in the uterus of their mother before the death of 
the intestate in order to gain any entitlement on intestacy.”277 
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The NSW Commission was primarily concerned that the 
inclusion of posthumously conceived children would generate 
delays and complexity in the distribution of estates, “especially 
when the number of people in a generation have to be 
determined for the purposes of per stirpes distribution.”278 In 
addition, this problem could be further compounded in 
situations dealing with collateral kin of the estate. The NSW 
Commission preferred the “simple approach of disregarding 
[after-born children]” for the purposes of intestate 
succession.279 Consequently, New South Wales decided to 
retain and limit intestate succession rights to the child en ventre 
sa mère. Indeed, for the purposes of the Succession Amendment 
(Intestacy) Act 2009, a “posthumous child” is defined as a child 
“who is born after the person’s death after a period of gestation 
in the uterus that commenced before the person’s death and 
survives the person for at least 30 days after birth.”280 
 
Explicit Legislative Inclusion of After-Born Children 
 
Rather than expressly deny after-born children rights, an 
alternative legislative response is to enact laws allowing for 
after-born children to inherit in situations of intestacy. Unlike 
the United Kingdom, no US state currently expressly prohibits 
the recognition of after-born children for all purposes.281 
Instead, and as of 2011, twelve states in the United States have 
enacted statutes providing rights for posthumously conceived 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129, online: Lawlink <http://www.lawlink.nsw.gov.au/lawlink/lrc/ 
ll_lrc.nsf/vwFiles/r116.pdf/$file/r116.pdf>. 
278  Ibid at 128. 
279  Ibid.  
280  Succession Amendment (Intestacy) Act 2009, No 29, 2009 at s 107. 
281  Kindregan Jr, supra note 12 at 442. See Deceased Fathers Act, supra 
note 268 at s 29(3B).  
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children in some capacity.282 Furthermore, the number of states 
addressing the rights of these children will likely increase in 
the upcoming year. Indeed, as this paper was being written, the 
US Supreme Court announced that it would decide in 2012 
whether children conceived through IVF after the death of their 
biological donor parent are entitled to survivor benefits under 
the SSA. The justices “agreed to hear an appeal by the Obama 
administration of a ruling by a US appeals court for a woman 
who seeks benefits for her twins conceived by artificial 
insemination after her husband's death.”283 In its appeal, 
administration lawyers said the Social Security Administration 
has received more than 100 applications for survivor benefits 
by after-born children; the rate of such applications has 
increased significantly in recent years.284 
 
US state legislatures which have chosen to enact laws 
addressing the inheritance rights of posthumously conceived 
children have done so by considering one of the following 
three approaches, namely, [1] adopting the Uniform Parentage 
Act provision on posthumously conceived children [“UPA”],285 
[2] broadening the definition of “children” in the state’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282  Wood, supra note 29 at 895. 
283  James Vicini, “Supreme Court to Hear In Vitro Fertilization Benefits” 
(16 November 2011) Reuters, online: Reuters <http://au.news.yahoo. 
com/queensland/a/-/odd/11704720/supreme-court-to-hear-in-vitro-
fertilization-benefits/>. The case involves Karen Capato, a mother 
who sued in a New Jersey federal court after her request for social 
security benefits for her twins was denied. In 1999, her husband, 
Robert Capato, deposited sperm at a fertility clinic after being 
diagnosed with esophageal cancer. He died in March 2002, and his 
wife subsequently underwent IVF. She gave birth to twins in 
September 2003. The Supreme Court case is Astrue v Capato, No 11-
159.  
284  Ibid. 
285  Unif Parentage Act (2000) §707 (amended 2002) [UPA]. 
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respective intestacy statute to include after-born children, and 
[3] designating all the legal rights of after-born children in a 
separate statute. No state has yet to adopt the second of the 
above three constructions. Consequently, the two remaining 
frameworks will be discussed briefly below.286 
 
The adoption of the UPA provision on posthumously 
conceived children is the most commonly followed course of 
action; states modify the provision as necessary to render it 
compatible with its overall intestacy scheme. The UPA 
“provides a template for many legislatures. . . . [It] contains an 
explicit consent requirement for an individual to gain 
recognition as the parent of [an after-born] child.”287 
Specifically, section 707 states: 
 
If an individual who consented in a record to be 
a parent by assisted reproduction dies before 
placement of eggs, sperm, or embryos, the 
deceased individual is not a parent of the 
resulting child unless the deceased spouse 
consented in a record that if assisted 
reproduction were to occur after the death, the 
deceased individual would be a parent of the 
child.288 
 
Seven states, namely, Colorado,289 Delaware,290 North 
Dakota,291 Texas,292 Utah,293 Washington,294 and Wyoming,295 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
286  Wood, supra note 29 at 889-890. 
287  Ibid.  
288  UPA, supra note 284. 
289  Colo Rev Stat Ann, supra note 191. 
290  Del Code Ann tit 13 at §8-707 (2009). 
291  ND Cent Code, supra note 191. 
292  Tex Fam Code Ann at §160.707 (Vernon 2008) [Tex Fam Code Ann]. 
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have adopted and customized the UPA provision, thus limiting 
an after-born child’s right to inherit to situations where the 
deceased biological donor parent consented to posthumous 
conception in a record completed before his or her death.296 An 
example of a modification made to the UPA by state 
legislatures includes the deletion of the word “individual” at 
the beginning of section 707 in Texas, Utah, and Washington, 
and substituting it for the word “spouse”; this makes clear that 
“those states did not wish to legalize consent to posthumous 
reproduction by unmarried persons.”297 The Texas statute also 
requires that the record containing the consent of the deceased 
person be maintained by a licensed physician.298  
 
Six states, namely, California,299 Florida,300 
Louisiana,301 Ohio,302 Virginia,303 and Iowa,304 have adopted 
the third approach and legislated into law unique statutes, 
distinct from their general intestacy regimes, in order to set 
forth the rights of children conceived posthumously.305 For 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293  Utah Code Ann. at §78B-15-707 (2008). 
294  Wash Rev Code Ann at §26.26.730 (West 2005). 
295  Wyo Stat Ann at §14-2-907 (2009). 
296  Wood, supra note 29 at 890. 
297  Kindregan, Jr, supra note 12 at 442. 
298  Tex Fam Code Ann, supra note 292. 
299  Cal Prob Code, supra note 191. 
300  Fla Stat Ann, supra note 191. 
301  La Rev Stat Ann, supra note 191. 
302  Ohio Rev Code Ann at §2105.14 (West 2005). 
303  Va Code Ann., supra note 193. 
304  Iowa Code Ann, supra note 191. 
305  Wood, supra note 29 at 891.  
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instance, Virginia’s statute employs a time restriction to curtail 
when a posthumously conceived child can legally participate in 
an intestacy. Virginia law provides at section 20-158(B) that an 
egg or sperm donor whose gametic material subsequently 
results in the creation of an embryo but dies before that embryo 
is implanted, is not the parent of the resulting child unless 
“implantation occurs before notice of the death can reasonably 
be communicated to the physician persforming the procedure” 
or “the person consents to be a parent in writing executed 
before the implantation.”306 If this provision were taken alone, 
it would “leave open the possibility of recognizing in [an after-
born] child any of the various rights that stem from a parental 
relationship”.307 Another statute, however, effectively negates 
the protections provided in section 20-158(B) by stating that an 
after-born child can only inherit from his or her deceased 
biological donor parent if born within ten months of that 
parent’s death.308 
 
Louisiana and California permit an after-born child to 
inherit from a deceased biological donor parent on the 
condition that he or she satisfies multiple specific requirements. 
For instance, in Louisiana, a posthumously conceived child can 
only inherit if a probate court receives the prior consent in 
writing from the deceased biological donor parent “permitting 
the surviving spouse’s use of his [or her] gametes, that the 
child is born to the surviving spouse and conceived using the 
gametes of the deceased, and that the child is born within three 
years of the decedent’s death.”309 The Louisiana statute 
additionally permits an heir or legatee of the decedent, whose 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
306  Va Code Ann, supra note 193. Interestingly, the statute addresses 
utero implantation of embryos but not methods using preserved sperm 
or eggs.  
307  Wood, supra note 29 at 891. 
308  Va Code Ann, supra note 193 at §20-164. 
309  La Rev Stat Ann, supra note 191 at §9:391.1(A). 
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share in the estate will be reduced if the after-born child is 
deemed an heir of the deceased, to bring an action to disavow 
paternity within one year of the after-born child’s birth.310 
 
California’s statute is the most comprehensive attempt 
to regulate posthumous reproduction by legislation to date.311 
The statute deems a posthumously conceived child to have 
been born during the lifetime of his or her deceased biological 
donor parent if the following statutory requirements are 
satisfied: [1] the decedent must, in a signed and dated writing 
that appoints an agent to control the use of the genetic material, 
consent to the use of his or her genetic material for posthumous 
conception;312 [2] the appointed agent must within four months 
of the decedent’s death give written notice by certified mail, 
return receipt requested, that the decedent’s genetic material is 
available for posthumous conception to a person having power 
to control the distribution of the decedent’s estate;313 and [3] 
the child must be conceived using the decedent’s genetic 
material within two years of the decedent’s death.314 This 
statute, consequently, recognizes “the real potential for 
posthumous reproduction, and solves several problems,” 
including, “the need for specific consent requirements, the need 
for a relative proximity of conception to the time of a parent’s 
death, and the need for the estate administrator to close the 
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311  Kindregan, Jr, supra note 12 at 443. The California courts were the 
first to struggle with the issues created by the possibility of 
posthumous conception. In 1993, the Second District California Court 
of Appeal was asked to decide if an unmarried woman, who had been 
designated by will to have the right to use the sperm of her deceased 
boyfriend, should be allowed to receive his cryopreserved sperm. 
312  Cal Prob Code, supra note 191 at §249.5(a). 
313  Ibid at §249.5(b).  
314  Ibid at §249.5(c).  
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Ontario has arrived at the proverbial fork in the road: leaving 
the SLRA untouched would be unwise, consequently, the 
province must definitively choose whether or not to expressly 
include or exclude posthumously conceived children from its 
intestacy regime. Both legislative options have their respective 
advantages and disadvantages. As a result, the following 
subsection will break down the strengths and weaknesses of 
each approach before recommending specific conditions for the 
Ontario legislature. In particular, the subsection will consider 
the following two benefits of excluding after-born children for 
the purposes of intestacy: [1] administrative efficiency; and [2] 
consistency with the traditional rule that all heirs must be living 
or in gestation at the time of a decedent’s passing.316 By 
contrast, the following two benefits of including after-born 
children for the purposes of intestacy will also be considered: 
[1] respect for the traditional principles of intestacy law; and 
[2] children’s best interests.317 
 




The primary reason cited for legislatively excluding after-born 
children from a jurisdiction’s intestacy regime is that it 
provides certainty and efficiency in the administration of 
estates.318 Indeed, administrative ease is a conceptual tool 
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316  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 405. 
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318  MLRC, supra note 28 at 15. 
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designed to prevent fraudulent claims and provide finality for 
the distributees receiving assets from an estate.319 As will be 
seen later on in this section, however, legislatures can mitigate 
these concerns by mandating specific conditions to be satisfied 
before an after-born child can take on an intestacy.320 
Consequently, while administrative efficiency is the strongest 
argument in favour of excluding after-born children for all 
purposes, it is excessive and unnecessary.321  
 
Firstly, fraudulent claims are of lesser concern in the 
context of posthumous reproduction. Given the advancement of 
today’s genetic testing capabilities, “combined with the 
medical involvement needed to successfully thaw and transfer 
genetic material,” it is virtually impossible for a child to bring 
forward a fraudulent claim.322 What is foreseeable, however, is 
for a surviving partner or spouse to forge or fabricate 
information regarding a deceased donor’s intent should a 
legislature require that a decedent have consented to supporting 
after-born children resulting from the posthumous use of his or 
her gametic material. These concerns are largely eradicated, 
however, by imposing heightened standards of proof or by 
creating time limitations.323 For instance, a legislature could 
incorporate a time condition that mirrors British Columbia’s, 
namely, that a “descendant [be] born within 2 years after the 
deceased person’s death and liv[e] for at least 5 days,”324 or 
implement an additional evidentiary consent requirement like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
319  See, for instance, Khabbaz, supra note 194 (the court pointed out that 
"waiting for the potential birth of a posthumously conceived child 
could tie up estate distributions indefinitely"). 
320  Section IV, infra note 362. 
321  Carpenter, supra note 54 at 406. 
322  Ibid.  
323  Ibid.  
324  Bill 4, supra note 182. 
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that of Texas’s, namely, that records containing the consent of 
the deceased be maintained by a licensed physician.325   
 
Secondly, concerns regarding an heir’s expectation of a 
speedy administration are blown out of proportion given the 
reality of existing probate practices and statutes.326 Indeed, 
“[t]o the surprise (and dismay) of many heirs, the distribution 
of a decedent’s assets is rarely an immediate event”; in fact, it 
is often quite a lengthy process.327 For instance, a prudent 
executor will take into account the following considerations 
before distributing a decedent’s assets, namely, the payment of 
income and estate taxes, the disposition of creditor claims and 
dependants’ relief applications, the liquidation of real estate, 
the winding down of businesses, and locating all potential 
heirs.328 The primary responsibility of an executor, in other 
words, is to ensure that each party receives his or her 
appropriate share of an estate and not, for instance, that each 
party receive their share promptly.329  
 
Thirdly, it is important to recognize the fact that, when 
a decedent dies intestate and is married at the time of his or her 
death, “a significant portion of the estate could be distributed in 
the “ordinary course” of administration, notwithstanding the 
potential that a posthumously conceived child may be later 
born.”330 In Ontario, for instance, an intestate’s surviving 
spouse is entitled to the entire estate of a decedent if he or she 
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330  Ibid. 
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died without leaving issue.331 If an intestate dies leaving issue, 
by contrast, a surviving spouse is still entitled to both a 
preferential and distributive share of the deceased’s estate; 
specifically, in addition to his or her distributive share which 
varies with the number of children or issue surviving, a 
surviving spouse is entitled to the first $200,000 of a 
decedent’s intestate estate.332 Accordingly, the birth of a 
posthumously conceived child would not delay or impinge 
upon an executor’s ability to administer those amounts to a 
surviving spouse after an estate’s debts and expenses were 
paid.333 This is particularly true in light of the fact that, more 
often than not, default rules in intestacy regimes apply to 
decedents of modest means who did not engage in any formal 
estate planning.334 Put in another way, it is possible (and even 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331  SLRA, supra note 25 at ss 44. Section 44 states: “Where a person dies 
intestate in respect of property and is survived by a spouse and not 
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332  Ibid at ss 45(1)-(3). Section 45(1) states: “Subject to subsection (3), 
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intestate estate and would, in effect, "divest" the decedent's parents of 
their share”. 
334  Ibid 412-13. 
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likely) that the aggregate value of an intestate estate will not 
exceed $200,000; the surviving spouse, as a result, would be 
entitled to the assets of the entire estate. 
 
In short, while a desire to avoid inconveniencing 
presumptive heirs is a compelling argument, it should not be 
prioritized over ensuring that all parties, including after-born 
children, receive a fair share of an intestate’s estate. 
Furthermore, potential heirs are subject to delayed distribution 
in a host of other circumstances that involve a waiting period of 
time to determine whether or not they will inherit from a 
decedent’s intestate estate. In fact, “if this ‘waiting period’ is 
reasonably limited, any delay would be both foreseeable and 
short term — a luxury not always available to the heirs when 
other claims remain pending.”335 
 
Consistency with the Traditional Rule 
 
A second possible benefit of expressly excluding after-born 
children from an intestacy regime is consistency with the 
traditional rule that all heirs must be living or in gestation at the 
time of a decedent’s death.336 Traditional rules should only be 
extended to novel situations, however, when the underlying 
principles of the rule still stand.337 This is not the case in the 
context of posthumous reproduction. More specifically, the 
“reality that the traditional rule responded to has changed 
dramatically over the past fifty years, and the traditional rule 
simply was not intended to address the scenarios possible 
today.”338 Indeed, the traditional rule can trace its origins all the 
way back to Rome at a time when posthumous reproduction 
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was over one thousand years away from becoming a scientific 
possibility.339 The purpose of the traditional rule is thus 
outdated and no longer covers the panoply of ways in which 
children are now conceived and will likely be conceived in the 
future.340   
 
Succession law has departed from its origins in other 
circumstances to keep pace with a changing society.341 As seen 
earlier in this paper, bastard children were precluded from 
inheriting under common law and early statutes because the 
law refused to recognize a parent-child relationship between 
children born out of wedlock and either parent. In time, 
however, children born outside of marriage were granted 
equivalent rights of inheritance with children born within 
marriage.342  The traditional rule was discarded, in other words, 
“despite that the underlying facts were no different when the 
rule was established than they are today.”343 What did change, 
however, was society’s attitude towards bastards coupled with 
a newfound desire to protect the best interests of children with 
no control over the way in which they were conceived.344  
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In the context of after-born children, the underlying 
facts have changed dramatically since the traditional rule was 
established. Legislatures should thus feel free to address the 
concerns of these children in a “fresh and proactive way”; 
indeed, statutory answers to the questions raised by the after-
born will be misguided if the traditional rule serves as the 
polestar.345 Just as society’s attitude towards children born out 
of wedlock evolved, so too will its view of posthumous 
conception and its resulting children. The law, in short, must 
similarly evolve.346  
 
The Benefits of Legislatively Including After-Born Children 
 
Respect for Traditional Principles of Intestacy Law 
 
One possible benefit of expressly including posthumously 
conceived children in a jurisdiction’s intestacy regime is that 
denying them rights would run counter to hallmark principles 
of probate law, namely, [a] achieving a decedent’s likely intent, 
and [b] the transmission of property from deceased intestates to 
their families, including spouses, children, and other blood 
relatives.347 Indeed, intestacy statutes such as the SLRA 
“represent a legislative attempt to provide citizens a 
distributive scheme that mirrors the intent of most 
decedents.”348 
  
Firstly, a blanket rule that refuses to recognize after-
born children for the purposes of inheritance captures the intent 
of some — not all — decedents who freeze their genetic 
material. In fact, rather than reflecting the desires of a majority 
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of deceased biological donor parents, the rule unreasonably 
prohibits inquiries into a decedent’s intent, including situations 
where intent to provide for an after-born child is undisputed.349 
Furthermore, as will be detailed in Section IV(d), it is possible 
to honor this principle of probate law by conditioning an after-
born child’s status as an heir on the deceased’s intent to support 
children resulting from posthumous conception.350 
 
Secondly, a primary goal of intestate succession law is 
to “transmit property to the presumed objects of the intestate’s 
bounty — the family.”351 Apart from common law partners and 
spouses, bounty means blood relations. And after-born 
children, for instance, are blood relatives.352 Indeed, from this 
perspective, the only difference between an after-born child 
and his or her already existing biological sibling is 
chronological. After-born children are biologically related to 
the intestate in the exact same degree as others who may take 
shares; as a result, “they ought to have the same status in the 
intestacy, and in the family.”353  
 
Children’s Best Interests  
 
A second possible benefit of including after-born children in 
the intestacy scheme of a jurisdiction is that it would be in their 
best interests to do so.354 Refusing to grant status to after-born 
children has collateral effects above and beyond the inability to 
receive a share of their deceased biological donor parent’s 
estate; possible repercussions include the inability of an after-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
349  Ibid. 
350  Infra note 397. 
351  MLRC, supra note 28 at 19. 
352  Ibid.  
353  Ibid. 
354  Ibid. 
230 CANADIAN JOURNAL OF FAMILY LAW [VOL. 27, 2011] 
	  
born child to inherit through — as opposed to directly — his or 
her deceased biological donor parent, and receive other benefits 
independent of the estate.355 As described earlier, inheritance-
related benefits are invaluable and can become a substantial 
source of practical support for the after-born and their 
families.356 States should facilitate the ability of families to 
financially look after their own children. Indeed, when children 
are not supported at home, they become a burden on the public 
purse — an outcome especially likely for the after-born given 
the surrounding circumstances of their family structures.357 In 
short, posthumously conceived children should be able to look 
to the intestate succession regime of their state for support 
before seeking it from the state.358 
 
For the reasons outlined above, the perceived benefits 
of legislatively excluding after-born children from a 
jurisdiction’s intestacy regime “may sound compelling in 
theory, but are minimal in application.”359 Indeed, rather than 
uphold an antiquated rule of shrinking relevance, or prioritize 
the convenience of potential heirs, the overriding concerns of 
succession law must be effectuating a decedent’s likely intent 
and protecting the best interests of his or her children.360 After-
born children should not be punished for the manner in which 
they are created. Instead, “a better approach would be to at 
least leave the door open to these children to share in assets 
otherwise available to a decedent’s heirs, subject to [particular] 
conditions”.361 The paper will detail below how administrative 
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efficiency, effectuating a decedent’s likely intent, and 
protecting the best interests of children can be achieved by 
balancing the following conditions in a posthumous 
reproduction context: [1] delay of distribution; [2] notice to 
interested parties; [3] marital status of the parents; and [4] 
consent of the deceased.362  
 
Balancing Act: Juggling the Interests at Stake When 
Extending Inheritance Rights to After-Born Children 
 
The extension of inheritance rights to posthumously conceived 
children necessarily implicates the interests of other parties; 
those rights, consequently, need to be carefully balanced and 
limited. Above and beyond the interests of posthumously 
conceived children, there are important concerns in need of 
being addressed, including the rights of other claimants, the 
procreative control of the deceased, and the importance of not 
leaving those in charge of intestate administration in a 
quandary over when and how to distribute property.363 
 
As stated earlier in this paper, the OLRC recommended 
in its 1985 Report that after-born children be entitled to a share 
of whatever remained undistributed in the intestate’s estate up 
to the date of their birth or gestation.364 In other words, “[t]here 
would be no recall of undistributed shares and no freezing of 
the estate after the death to await the possible appearance of [an 
after-born] child.”365 After-born children would only take the 
appropriate proportionate share of the remaining estate and “no 
effort would be required to bring them up to parity with those 
who had already received shares”.366 The OLRC approach is, 
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on one hand, an advantageous one. For instance, if an after-
born child is only entitled to whatever remained undistributed 
in the estate up to the date of their birth or gestation, there 
would be no subsequent need to set a time limit for the delay of 
distribution; this model also avoids the necessity of informing 
interested parties that a posthumous conception is a possibility 
and having to detail its attending consequences.367   
 
On the other hand, the OLRC model is a “shabby 
treatment of [after-born] children, awarding them whatever 
crumbs may happen to be left on the table when they come into 
existence, and not a full share by right.”368 Furthermore, this 
model fails to consider the wishes of the deceased intestate 
concerning the use of his or her gametic material posthumously 
for the purposes of conception. Consequently, this legislative 
approach to the inclusion of after-born children inadequately 
balances all the competing interests at stake.369 Should Ontario 
choose to reform the SLRA in favour of after-born children, the 
province must consider balancing the following legislative 
conditions. 
 
Delay of Distribution 
 
Ontario needs to consider whether an after-born child must be 
born within a specific time period after a biological donor 
parent’s death before a decedent’s estate can be 
administered.370 It is important to do so because it provides 
finality to the administrative process where an after-born child 
could potentially divest other distributees of all or a part of 
their share of a decedent’s estate.371 Without a time limitation, 
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an estate could remain open indefinitely as an executor awaits 
the birth of an after-born child — an event in which there is no 
guarantee will actually happen.372 Furthermore, the chosen time 
limit needs to be responsive to — and reflective of — the 
situation at hand. Indeed, a surviving spouse or partner must be 
given a realistic and unpressured amount of time to grieve in 
order to make the life-altering decision of parenting a 
posthumously conceived child.373 Examples of statutory time 
limits include Louisiana’s, which requires an after-born child’s 
birth to occur within three years of the death of the biological 
donor parent, and California’s, which mandates only that a 
child be in utero within two years of the biological donor 
parent’s death.374 Both states delay the administration of an 
intestate’s estate by up to three years.  The justifications given 
for a two or three year conception window include: [1] it 
provides a grieving spouse or partner with an appropriate 
amount of time to prepare emotionally for a posthumous 
conception; [2] it provides a sufficient amount of time for a 
surviving spouse or partner to become pregnant if initial 
attempts are unsuccessful; and [3] it provides a strict cutoff 
date on which both executors and distributees can rely.375 
 
In light of the above considerations, it is clear that a 
time limitation period needs to be of a reasonable duration. 
That being said, each of the above considerations can be 
satisfied without establishing an absolute cutoff. More 
specifically, “[a]n approach that limits [executor] and 
transferee liability after a certain point, but does not close the 
door completely, still satisfies each of these goals.”376 Indeed, 
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if an after-born child arrives after the limitation period expires, 
he or she should still be entitled to receive a share of any assets 
that remain undistributed in the estate. Put in another way, an 
executor should have the discretion to retain assets for a 
surviving partner or spouse who is trying to get pregnant but 
who has failed to conceive an after-born child within the 
limitation period. This distinction is important. The overall 
purpose of the limitation period should relate to liability for 
distributions, and not, for instance, a child’s ability to inherit as 
an heir.377 Consequently, once a limitation period ends, an 
executor should be free to distribute an estate’s assets to the 
proper devisees/beneficiaries as they then stand, and neither 
“the [executor] nor the recipient shall have any liability to 
later-born children for doing so.”378 
 
Notice to Interested Parties 
 
A second condition the Ontario legislature must consider is 
whether a surviving spouse or partner should provide an 
executor or other fiduciary in charge of a decedent’s estate with 
notice that the deceased has genetic material available for the 
purposes of conceiving a child posthumously.379 California is 
currently the only jurisdiction in the United States with a notice 
requirement.380 Specifically, California requires that the person 
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in control of a deceased’s genetic material notify each person 
with control over the decedent’s assets that that person intends 
to use the genetic material; notice must also be provided no 
later than four months from the date a decedent’s death 
certificate is issued or the date a judgment is entered declaring 
the decedent’s death.381 Furthermore, failure to provide notice 
automatically precludes an after-born child from participating 
in his or her biological donor parent’s intestacy.382 
 
Like California, Ontario should establish a notice 
requirement. Unlike California, however, the failure of a 
surviving spouse or partner to notify an executor of his or her 
intent to use a decedent’s genetic material should not bar an 
after-born child from receiving assets. Indeed, similar to the 
time period limitation, a child’s status as an heir should not 
depend on the satisfaction of a procedural requirement over 
which neither the child or the decedent has any control. 
Instead, “the survivor’s failure to provide such notice should 
simply limit the fiduciary and recipient’s liability for 
distributions made after the notice period expires without 
knowledge by the fiduciary of the survivor’s intent to have the 
decedent’s [after-born child].”383 Furthermore, if an executor 
receives notice after the period has lapsed for notifying the 
appropriate parties, he or she should have the discretion to 
retain all or some of the remaining undistributed assets of the 
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estate for the duration of the time limitation period outlined 
earlier.384  
 
An appropriate time limit for the notice requirement 
could mirror the limitation period set forth in the SLRA for 
launching dependants’ relief applications. Specifically, section 
61.1 states that all applications must be made “after six months 
from the grant of letters probate of the will or of letters of 
administration.”385 During the limitation period, the 
administrator cannot distribute any part of the estate — except 
for paying out creditors — because “the whole of the net estate 
must be available for payment to those judged in need of 
relief.”386 It makes no sense, consequently, to have a shorter 
notice period for after-born children since no distribution of the 
estate could be made anyways. However, similar to the 
limitation period in the SLRA, judges should be given the 
discretion to extend the time limit to account for the fact that a 
six-month period might not be a sufficient amount of time for a 
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Marital Status of the Parents 
 
A third condition the Ontario legislature must consider is 
whether a deceased biological donor parent must have been 
married to the surviving party at the time of his or her death in 
order for an after-born child to participate in an intestacy.388 In 
British Columbia’s forthcoming statute, for instance, an after-
born child will only be deemed an heir if there is proof that the 
deceased gave written consent to use his or her genetic material 
posthumously to a person who was “married to, or in a 
marriage-like relationship with, the deceased person when that 
person died.”389 Similarly, Louisiana and Iowa both require that 
the parties be married at the time of a decedent’s death in order 
for a future after-born child to be granted the status of an 
heir.390 In California, Colorado, and North Dakota, by contrast, 
an after-born child can be deemed an heir irrespective of the 
deceased biological donor parent’s relationship to the surviving 
party.391  
 
Given that a primary theme of this paper is the 
condemnation of discrimination on the basis of birth status, it 
would be counterintuitive to recommend that Ontario include 
the marital status of the parents as a legitimate condition for 
determining an after-born child’s status as an heir. Indeed, in 
addition to being incompatible with sections 1(4) of the CLRA 
and 1(3) of the SLRA, requiring the parties to have been 
married at the time of the biological donor parent’s death 
would reconnect a relationship long severed in the province, 
namely, a child’s legal status and his or her parent’s 
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relationship.392 Furthermore, including a marital status 
condition would run counter to two important functions of 
intestate succession law, specifically, effectuating a decedent’s 
likely intent, and protecting the best interests of an intestate’s 
children. If a legislature is concerned with carrying out the 
intent of the deceased, “it is purely anecdotal whether more 
married individuals would consent to the posthumous use of 
their genetic material than would single individuals in a 
committed relationship.”393 In fact, if Ontario restricted 
intestate inheritance rights to after-born children whose parents 
were married, the statute would, in nearly every instance, fail to 
provide support to any child whether or not their parents were 
married.394 As explained earlier in this paper, surviving spouses 
are entitled in a majority of cases to all or a substantial portion 
of an intestate’s estate regardless of whether the decedent left 
children or issue.395 Consequently, if a goal of Ontario is to 
protect the best interests of children, the marital status of a 
biological donor parent should not be relevant.396 
 
Consent of the Deceased 
 
A fourth condition the Ontario legislature must consider is the 
kind and degree of consent required by a biological donor 
parent to the posthumous use of his or her genetic material.397 
While scholars uniformly support a consent requirement, they 
disagree on its exact formulation.398 For instance, some 
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academics argue that if a decedent consented to the 
posthumous use of his or her genetic material, that person 
should be “deemed to have consented to provide support as a 
matter of law.”399 Other scholars argue, however, that consent 
to support an after-born child should not be presumed and that 
a decedent’s intent should be the controlling factor. 
Accordingly, an after-born child should only be entitled to a 
share of the estate of his or her biological donor parent if that 
parent affirmatively consented to support him or her upon 
death.400 
 
In Woodward, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts 
recognized the importance of respecting every individual’s 
reproductive rights, including deceased persons; “parenthood, 
[in other words], should not be thrust upon anyone.”401 In 
response to that principle, the Woodward court held that proof 
of consent of the deceased to the use of his or her gametic 
material for the purposes of conceiving a child posthumously 
should be a condition of eligibility for after-born children to 
inherit in an intestate succession. Furthermore, proof of consent 
needs to be clear and convincing; “after all, the banking of such 
material may indicate only a wish to reproduce after some 
lifetime contingency, not necessarily a wish to reproduce after 
death.”402 
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Every single state in the United States that admits 
after-born children to intestate inheritance rights requires the 
consent of the deceased to posthumous conception. For 
instance, Louisiana stipulates that a decedent must have 
“specifically authorized in writing” the posthumous use of 
gametic material.403 California additionally requires that 
consent be “in writing . . . signed by the decedent and dated.”404 
In Canada, by contrast, the Assisted Human Reproduction Act 
[“AHRA”]405 will have significant implications for any consent 
requirement enacted in relation to the use of gametic material 
posthumously. More specifically, the AHRA “creates a uniform 
federal scheme for the use of genetic material for reproductive 
purposes based on the free and informed consent of the donor,” 
regardless of whether the material is used by the donor himself 
or herself, the donor’s spouse or common law partner, or by a 
third party.406 
 
The legal status of the AHRA is in doubt since the SCC 
rendered their decision on the constitutionality of various 
provisions contained therein.407 Indeed, in Reference re 
Assisted Human Reproduction Act, sections 8-12 of the AHRA 
were challenged as being ultra vires the legislative authority of 
Parliament.408 Section 8 of the statute deals specifically with 
consent-related issues. For instance, section 8(1) of the AHRA 
mandates that no person can use reproductive materials for the 
purpose of creating an embryo “unless the donor of the 
material has given written consent . . . to its use for that 
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purpose.”409 Furthermore, section 8(2) states that human 
reproductive material cannot be removed from a donor’s body 
after the donor’s death for the purpose of creating an embryo 
“unless the donor of the material has given written consent . . . 
to its removal for that purpose.”410 
 
In a slim majority decision, the SCC ultimately 
concluded that the consent provisions under the AHRA are a 
valid exercise of the criminal law power: 
 
At the heart of s. 8 lies the fundamental 
importance that we ascribe to human autonomy. 
. . . There is a consensus in society that the 
consensual use of reproductive material 
implicates fundamental notions of morality.  
This confirms that s. 8 is valid criminal law.411 
 
In Canada, consequently, it would seem as though an after-born 
child could not lawfully be produced without the written 
consent of the deceased. In fact, the only regulations that have 
been promulgated under the AHRA to date are those related to 
section 8.412 In short, irrespective of the constitutional validity 
of section 8 of the AHRA, it would still be wise for the SLRA to 
include a requirement for the written consent of the deceased 
“to make clear that, even post-mortem, reproductive choice 
would be protected.”413 Indeed, as emphasized by the SCC, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
409  AHRA, supra note 405 at s 8.1. 
410  Ibid at s 8.2. 
411  Reference re Assisted Human Reproduction Act, supra note 408 at 
para 90. 
412 Barbara von Tigerstrom, “Federal Health Legislation and the Assisted 
Human Reproduction Act Reference” (2011) 74 Sask L Rev 33 at 
note 4. 
413  MLRC, supra note 28 at 21. 
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informed consent is the quintessential marker of human 
autonomy.414   
 
Consent to Inheritance Rights 
 
In Woodward, the court delineated a two-fold consent 
requirement; more specifically, a deceased intestate would 
have to have consented to [1] posthumous conception, and [2] 
supporting the resulting after-born child(ren).415 The objective 
of the second consent requirement is to ensure that the 
deceased donor intended to create after-born children with 
inheritance rights. Furthermore, this second requirement is an 
attempt by the court to differentiate between gametic donations 
by anonymous third parties and donations by parents 
specifically intending to produce after-born children. Sperm 
donation, for instance, is generally anonymous and 
confidential. By requiring proof of consent to support children 
produced from cryopreserved sperm, however, a legislature 
would shield anonymous donors from the legal responsibilities 
of parenthood and “encourage the socially beneficial practice 
of sperm donation.”416 The inclusion of the second consent 
requirement in the SLRA, consequently, would provide an 
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Inheritance from Other Relatives 
 
The US case of In re Estate of Kolacy418 stands for the 
principle that after-born children can inherit from both their 
deceased biological donor parent and — through their deceased 
parent — other relatives such as grandparents or collateral 
family members. Of the US statutes that admit inheritance 
rights to after-born children, none place limitations on the 
purposes for which parentage may be determined; 
consequently, “rights in intestacies from or through deceased 
[biological donor] parents may be inferred.”419 The statutes in 
Louisiana and California,420 however, appear to limit after-born 
children’s inheritance rights to their respective biological donor 
parent’s estate. For instance, in Louisiana, the legislation states: 
 
[A]ny child conceived after the death of a 
decedent, who specifically authorized in writing 
his surviving spouse to use his gametes, shall be 
deemed the child of such decedent with all 
rights, including the capacity to inherit from the 
decedent, as the child would have had if the 
child had been in existence at the time of the 
death of the deceased parent.421 
 
On its face, “[t]here seems to be no principled reason to restrict 
[the] intestacy rights of [after-born] children” to their deceased 
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biological donor parent’s estate.422 Indeed, after-born children 
are biologically related to other family members; consequently, 
they too should have rights in intestacies above and beyond 




Representations of bastard children as “threatening pretender[s] 
to the legal family’s property” have a rich and complicated 
history in both literature and law.424 And while the archetype of 
the bastard as private property usurper can trace its origins all 
the way back to the Old Testament, so too can references to the 
need of protecting all of society’s children. In Psalm 127, “A 
Song of Ascent”, children are perceived as a blessing from 
God:  
 
3. Behold, children are a gift of the Lord; the 
fruit of the womb is a reward.  4. Like arrows in 
the hand of a warrior, so are the children of one's 
youth.  5. How blessed is the man whose quiver 
is full of them; they shall not be ashamed, when 
they speak with their enemies in the gate.425 
 
Not all children, however, are protected equally. The advent of 
reproductive technologies, coupled with a legal system that 
cannot keep pace, has resulted in a new class of children being 
denied inheritance rights solely on the basis of the way they 
were conceived.426 Ontario has reached a point where making 
up its mind is the only prudent action available to lawmakers 
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regarding the rights of the after-born. And, unless it takes 
legislative action — by explicitly including after-born children 
in its intestacy scheme — the province risks dispossessing a 
group of children of fundamental rights in a manner 
reminiscent of its treatment of children born out of wedlock in 
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